

**ANALYSIS OF THE NOVEMBER 28, 2017 DECISION AND JUDGMENT
OF ACTING SUPREME COURT JUSTICE DENISE A. HARTMAN**

**Center for Judicial Accountability, et al. v. Cuomo, et al.,
Albany Co. #5122-2016**

This analysis constitutes a “legal autopsy”¹ of the November 28, 2017 decision and judgment of Acting Supreme Court Justice Denise A. Hartman, denying plaintiffs’ June 12, 2017 order to show cause for reargument/renewal/vacatur of her May 5, 2017 decision and May 5, 2017 amended decision – which she recognized as also seeking her disqualification, which she denied – and granting defendants’ July 21, 2017 cross-motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ sixth cause of action. It follows upon plaintiffs’ analyses of Judge Hartman’s prior decisions – the accuracy of which neither she nor defendants ever denied or disputed. These are:

- plaintiffs’ “legal autopsy”/analysis of Judge Hartman’s December 21, 2016 decision, annexed as Exhibit U to their February 15, 2017 order to show cause for her disqualification for interest and for the actual bias manifested by her December 21, 2016 decision – relief her May 5, 2017 decision denied;
- plaintiffs’ analysis of Judge Hartman’s May 5, 2017 decision and May 5, 2017 amended decision, furnished at ¶¶5-8, 10-11 of their June 12, 2017 order to show cause for reargument/renewal/vacatur – relief her November 28, 2017 decision and judgment denied;
- plaintiffs’ “legal autopsy”/analysis of Judge Hartman’s June 26, 2017 decision, annexed as Exhibit I to their August 25, 2017 reply papers in further support of their June 12, 2017 order to show cause and in opposition to defendants’ July 21, 2017 cross-motion.

Just as plaintiffs’ prior analyses demonstrated that Judge Hartman’s prior decisions were each criminal frauds, falsifying the record in all material respects to grant defendants relief to which they

¹ The term “legal autopsy” is taken from the law review article “*Legal Autopsies: Assessing the Performance of Judges and Lawyers Through the Window of Leading Contract Cases*”, 73 Albany Law Review 1 (2009), by Gerald Caplan, recognizing that the legitimacy of judicial decisions can only be determined by comparison with the record (‘...Performance assessment cannot occur without close examination of the trial record, briefs, oral argument and the like...’ (p. 53)).

This is set forth at the outset of plaintiffs’ “legal autopsy” of Acting Supreme Court Justice Roger McDonough’s decisions in their first citizen-taxpayer action (#1788-2014) – annexed as Exhibit G to their September 2, 2016 verified complaint in their second citizen-taxpayer action (#5122-2016). Neither the premise – nor the accuracy of plaintiffs’ Exhibit G analysis – has ever been denied or disputed by defendants, or by Judge McDonough, the duty judge on September 2, 2016, who reviewed the verified complaint, or by Judge Hartman to whom the case was then assigned.

were not entitled, *as a matter of law*, and to deny plaintiffs relief to which they were entitled, *as a matter of law*”, and that they violated a multitude of provisions of New York’s Penal Law, including:

- Penal Law §175.35 (“offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree”);
- Penal Law §496 (“corrupting the government”) – part of the “Public Trust Act”;
- Penal Law §155.42 (“grand larceny in the first degree”);
- Penal Law §190.65 (“scheme to defraud in the first degree”);
- Penal Law §195.20 (“defrauding the government”);
- Penal Law §105.15 (“conspiracy in the second degree”);
- Penal Law §20.00 (“criminal liability for conduct of another”);
- Penal Law §195 (“official misconduct”),

this analysis demonstrates the same with respect to her November 28, 2017 decision, likewise, “so totally devoid of evidentiary support as to render [it] unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause” of the United States Constitution, *Garner v. State of Louisiana*, 368 U.S. 157, 163 (1961); *Thompson v. City of Louisville*, 362 U.S. 199 (1960).

The fraudulence of Judge Hartman’s prior decisions is verifiable, within minutes, from plaintiffs’ reply memoranda of law that were before her when she rendered them, each a “paper trail” of the record. So, here, the fraudulence of her November 28, 2017 decision is verifiable, within minutes, from plaintiffs’ August 25, 2017 reply memorandum of law – a “paper trail” of the record before her.

Virtually ALL the facts, law, and legal argument presented by plaintiffs’ August 25, 2017 reply memorandum of law – and by plaintiff Sassower’s reply affidavit accompanying it – are omitted from Judge Hartman’s November 28, 2017 decision. As for Assistant Attorney General Adrienne Kerwin’s opposition to plaintiffs’ June 12, 2017 order to show cause, contained within her July 21, 2017 cross-motion, the decision only minimally mentions it, without reference to its fraudulence, demonstrated, from beginning to end and in virtually every line, by plaintiffs’ August 25, 2017 reply memorandum of law in support of requested threshold relief:

- (1) for sanctions, and disciplinary and criminal referrals of AAG Kerwin and those supervising her in the Attorney General’s office, responsible for her litigation fraud;
- (2) for the disqualification of Attorney General Schneiderman, himself a defendant, from representing his co-defendants; and
- (3) for the Attorney General’s representation of plaintiffs or intervention on their behalf, pursuant to Executive Law §63.1 and State Finance Law Article 7-A (§123 *et seq.*).

None of these three threshold issues are adjudicated by Judge Hartman’s November 28, 2017 decision, which conceals them all. Ditto, the even more threshold issue presented by plaintiffs’ August 25, 2017 reply memorandum of law of Judge Hartman’s duty to make disclosure, absent her

disqualifying herself for demonstrated actual bias.

With respect to Judge Hartman's duty to disqualify herself or make disclosure, suffice to quote the concluding paragraph of plaintiff Sassower's August 25, 2017 reply affidavit in further support of plaintiffs' June 12, 2016 order to show cause and in opposition to AAG Kerwin's July 21, 2017 cross-motion:

"12. Unless this Court is able to do the impossible – refute plaintiffs' record-based analyses (see ¶6, supra), particularizing with facts and law, that its December [2]1, 2016 decision, its May 5, 2017 decision and May 5, 2017 amended decision, and its June 26, 2017 decision each obliterate all cognizable adjudicative standards and flagrantly falsify the record – it must disqualify itself forthwith based on its demonstrated actual bias and vacate those decisions. Absent its doing so, it must make the disclosure as to its judicial compensation interest in the lawsuit, its relationships with defendants and personnel in the Attorney General's office, and other facts bearing upon its fairness and impartiality^[fn2] that it has willfully failed and refused to make throughout the nearly full year it has had this case, all the while concealing, without adjudication, the Attorney General's litigation fraud, by its AAGs Kerwin and Lynch, which plaintiffs meticulously laid out in the record before it." (underlining in the original).

As hereinafter shown, Judge Hartman's November 28, 2017 decision conceals plaintiffs' request for disclosure – of which it makes none – and, resting on all her prior decisions,

- denies plaintiffs' June 12, 2017 order to show cause by two sentences which, in completely conclusory fashion and by concealing plaintiffs' "legal autopsy"/analyses of her prior decisions and their entire content, LIES that plaintiffs "failed to establish matters of fact or law that the Court overlooked or misrepresented that would warrant reargument, or new facts that would warrant renewal... Nor...grounds for disqualification and vacatur..." (see pp. 10-11, *infra*)
- grants AAG Kerwin's July 21, 2017 cross-motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs' sixth cause of action:

(1) by adhering to the LIE in her June 26, 2017 decision that plaintiffs' sub-cause E had been dismissed by her December 21, 2016 decision – such LIE having originated in AAG Helena Lynch's April 21, 2017 opposition to plaintiffs' March 29, 2017 order to show cause for summary judgment on sub-cause E, thereafter re-asserted by AAG Kerwin's July 21, 2017 cross-motion for summary judgment to defendants on sub-cause E (see pp. 12-13, *infra*);

(2) by manufacturing *sua sponte*, fraudulent argument for granting defendants summary judgment on plaintiffs’ sub-cause D to replace her *sua sponte*, fraudulent argument in her June 26, 2017 decision for denying plaintiffs summary judgment on their sub-cause D (see pp. 15-22, *infra*);

(3) by adhering to her *sua sponte*, fraudulent argument for denying plaintiffs summary judgment on their sub-causes A and B, manufactured by her June 26, 2017 decision – on which AAG Kerwin’s July 21, 2017 cross-motion relied for summary judgment to defendants on sub-causes A and B (see pp. 14-15, *infra*);

(4) by adhering to her *sua sponte* argument for denying plaintiffs summary judgment on their sub-cause C, manufactured by her June 26, 2017 decision – on which AAG Kerwin’s July 21, 2017 cross-motion relied for summary judgment to defendants on sub-cause C (see p. 15, *infra*).

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Plaintiffs’ August 25, 2017 Memorandum of Law is Dispositive that Judge Hartman’s November 28, 2017 Decision is a Criminal Fraud -- Beginning with its Concealment of the Four Threshold Issues She was Duty-Bound to Adjudicate, But Did Not Because Each Threshold Issue Could Only be Adjudicated in Plaintiffs’ Favor

One need only read the four-page “Introduction” to plaintiffs’ 52-page August 25, 2017 reply memorandum of law to recognize why Judge Hartman’s November 28, 2017 decision could not – and does not – confront it, beginning with the four threshold integrity issues it summarized pertaining to herself and the Attorney General. The “Introduction” was as follows:

“This memorandum of law is submitted in reply to defendants’ opposition to plaintiffs’ June 12, 2017 order to show cause for reargument/renewal/vacatur of this Court’s May 5, 2017 decision and order and May 5, 2017 amended decision and order, interposed by Assistant Attorney General Adrienne Kerwin, who identifies herself as ‘of counsel’ to defendant Attorney General ERIC SCHNEIDERMAN, attorney for himself and his co-defendants. As AAG Kerwin has combined her July 21, 2017 opposition with a cross-motion, this memorandum of law is also submitted in opposition thereto.

AAG Kerwin’s opposition/cross-motion consists of her notice of cross-motion, her affirmation, and her memorandum of law. As hereinafter demonstrated, all three are ‘frauds on the court’, as that term is defined^[fn1] – and replicate her *modus operandi* of litigation fraud that plaintiffs chronicled by each of their five memoranda of law in their prior citizen-taxpayer action^[fn2] and, in this citizen-taxpayer action, by their September 30, 2016 memorandum of law and then by their analysis of AAG Kerwin’s March 22, 2017 opposition to their February 15, 2017 order to show cause for the Court’s disqualification for actual bias and interest and for vacatur of its December 21, 2016 decision by reason thereof, annexed as Exhibit E to their June 12, 2017 order to show cause – the same as is now before the Court.^[fn3]

Plaintiff Sassower’s June 12, 2017 moving affidavit herein describes the purpose of the Exhibit E analysis it annexed, stating:

‘11. As the May 5, 2017 decision makes no comment or finding with respect to AAG Kerwin’s March 22, 2017 opposition papers – as was its obligation to do pursuant to §100.3D(2) of the Chief Administrator’s Rules Governing Judicial Conduct – annexed is plaintiffs’ analysis thereof (Exhibit E), which

I wrote and to whose accuracy, both factually and legally, I swear. Chronicled therein is the flagrant fraud of AAG Kerwin's March 22, 2017 opposing affirmation and memorandum of law that the Court 'overlooked' when it 'Considered' them. Such defense fraud, to which the Court gave a 'free pass', reinforces the four threshold integrity issues highlighted by plaintiffs' Exhibit U analysis [of the Court's December 21, 2016 decision] (at pp. 3-8) and, prior thereto, by their September 30, 2016 memorandum of law (at pp. 1-6, 42-52) — beginning with the Court's duty to make disclosure of its personal and professional relationships with defendants, with AAG Kerwin, and with supervisory levels at the Attorney General's office, absent its disqualifying itself, as no lawyer would do what AAG Kerwin did by her March 22, 2017 opposition papers unless confident that a biased and self-interested court would let her get away with it.'

Fair to say that Exhibit E is the most important exhibit to plaintiffs' June 12, 2017 order to show cause – and not the least reason because it establishes that, wading through the flagrant deceits of AAG Kerwin's March 22, 2017 opposition papers, she had not denied or disputed the accuracy of plaintiffs' Exhibit U analysis of the Court's December 21, 2016 decision, upon which plaintiffs' February 15, 2017 order to show cause to disqualify the Court for actual bias was based. This sufficed to make her opposition to plaintiffs' February 15, 2017 order to show cause frivolous, *as a matter of law*, as plaintiffs' Exhibit U analysis demonstrated that the December 21, 2016 decision had:

'falsif[ied] the record in all material respects to grant defendants relief to which they [were] not entitled, *as a matter of law*, and to deny plaintiffs relief to which they [were] entitled, *as a matter of law*' (p. 1, Exhibit U to plaintiffs' February 15, 2017 order to show cause).

AAG Kerwin's July 21, 2017 opposition/cross-motion never identifies what plaintiffs' Exhibit E is – and does not contest its showing that her March 22, 2017 opposition papers had not contested the accuracy of plaintiffs' Exhibit U analysis of the Court's December 21, 2016 decision.^[fn4] Nor does she take the opportunity to now contest the accuracy of plaintiffs' Exhibit U analysis – or justify how the Court's May 5, 2017 decision, in denying plaintiffs' February 15, 2017 order to show cause, could do so without denying or disputing its accuracy – indeed, by concealing its very existence. Nevertheless, she blithely purports that the Court should deny reargument/renewal of its May 5, 2017 decision and May 5, 2017 amended decision pertaining to its December 21, 2016 decision. She then takes these three fraudulent judicial decisions – all three proven as such by plaintiffs' Exhibit U analysis – and, adding to them the Court's subsequently-rendered, comparably fraudulent, June 26, 2017 decision, makes them the basis for her cross-motion.

The record herein is one of symbiosis – the Court, which has a HUGE financial interest in this citizen-taxpayer action and has relationships with defendants, especially with defendants CUOMO and SCHNEIDERMAN, under whom it worked during its 30 years in the Attorney General’s office, covers up and facilitates the Attorney General’s litigation fraud, by its assistant attorneys general, who, in turn, cover up for the Court’s fraudulent judicial decisions.

This Court’s fraud, by its June 26, 2017 decision, encompassing and building upon the frauds of its prior three decisions, is particularized by plaintiffs’ analysis of the June 26, 2017 decision, annexed to plaintiff Sassower’s accompanying affidavit as Exhibit I. AAG Kerwin’s fraud, by her July 21, 2017 opposition/cross-motion to plaintiffs’ instant order to show cause is below.

Bottom line is that the relief compelled by plaintiffs’ June 12, 2017 order to show cause, beginning with adjudication of the threshold integrity issues relating to the Court and the Attorney General, identified at ¶7 of plaintiff Sassower’s moving affidavit, is even more compelled by the subsequent record, of which these reply papers are a road map.

Plaintiffs’ have repeatedly furnished the Court with the law pertaining to these threshold integrity issues – as recently as their May 15, 2017 memorandum of law in reply and in further support of their March 29, 2017 order to show cause, at pages 49-63 thereof under the title heading: ‘PLAINTIFFS’ REQUESTED AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF TO SAFEGUARD THE INTEGRITY OF THESE JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS’. In the interest of economy, plaintiffs incorporate by reference its first two sections (at pp. 49-58):

- I. The Court’s First Threshold Duty:
To Disclose Facts Bearing Upon its Fairness & Impartiality
- II. The Court’s Second Threshold Duty:
To Ensure that the Parties are Properly Represented by Counsel,

but do repeat, *verbatim*, changing only relevant facts, its subsequent three sections (at pp. 58-63):

- III. The Court’s Power under 22 NYCRR §130-1.1(d) to Act ‘Upon its Own Initiative’ & Impose Costs & Sanctions against AAG [Kerwin] for her Frivolous Opposition Papers
- IV. The Court’s Mandatory Disciplinary Responsibilities under §100.3D of the Chief Administrator’s Rules Governing Judicial Conduct

V. Judiciary Law §487 Provides the Court with a Further Means to Protect Itself and Plaintiffs from AAG [Kerwin's] Demonstrated Fraud and Deceit.”

(plaintiffs' August 25, 2017 reply memorandum of law, “Introduction”, pp. 1-4, italics, underlining, and capitalization in the original).

The Decision's Coverage (at p. 1)

The decision begins with a coverage page (p. 1) containing the case caption and, beneath it, a section entitled “Appearances”, the first of which is “ELENA RUTH SASSOWER”, identified as “Plaintiff pro se”, with an address listed as “PO Box 8101, White Plains, New York 10602”.

The address is incorrect – and repeats the identical error pointed out by plaintiffs’ “legal autopsy”/analysis of Judge Hartman’s December 21, 2016 decision (at p. 8) and by their “legal autopsy”/analysis of her June 26, 2017 decision (at p. 7), whose repetition here is inexplicable except as a reflection that Judge Hartman was so hell-bent on “throwing” the case that she did not see fit to read either analysis.

The Decision's Untitled Three Prefatory Paragraphs (at pp. 2-3)

Page 2 of the decision is headed with the name “Hartman, J.”, followed by three paragraphs, each suffused with fraud.

The first paragraph is four sentences (at p. 2). Unlike prior decisions which had concealed that this is a citizen-taxpayer action, the first sentence of the first paragraph identifies this, stating:

“In this citizen-taxpayer action for declaratory and injunctive relief, pro se plaintiff Elena Ruth Sassower challenges legislation enacted in 2015 that created the Commission on Legislative, Judicial and Executive Compensation (Commission) and budget legislation for the 2016-2017 fiscal year.” (at p. 2).

Plaintiff Sassower is not “pro se”, she is unrepresented by counsel – and, at every juncture of the case, she and the unrepresented corporate plaintiff, Center for Judicial Accountability, Inc. (CJA), raised, as a threshold issue, their entitlement to representation by the Attorney General, pursuant to the citizen-taxpayer statute, which expressly contemplates his involvement as plaintiff, or on behalf of plaintiffs (State Finance Law §123-a(3); §123-c-(3); §123-d; §123-e(2)), as likewise pursuant to Executive Law §63.1, which predicates his representation on the “interests of the state”.

As with all her prior decisions, Judge Hartman does not identify – or adjudicate – this threshold issue anywhere, because such would require her to confront that the Attorney General’s litigation fraud establishes, *prima facie*, that he has NO legitimate defense to the citizen-taxpayer action and that his

duty, pursuant to both State Finance Law, §§123 *et seq.* and Executive §63.1, is to be representing the individual and corporate plaintiffs. Indeed, as to what became of the corporate plaintiff, unrepresented by an attorney and for whom the non-attorney plaintiff Sassower could not provide representation, Judge Hartman stows it in her footnote 1:

“Because plaintiff Sassower is not an attorney, this Court in its December 21, 2016 Decision and Order dismissed causes of action she seeks to assert on behalf of the Center for Judicial Accountability, Inc.” (at p. 2)

Tellingly, this footnote 1 annotates not the above-quoted first sentence of the first paragraph of this section, but the sentence in her third paragraph (at p. 3) reading:

“...plaintiff has asserted a sufficient nexus to the fiscal activity of the State to confer standing under State Finance Law §123-b(1)...”.

This is also the only place in Judge Hartman’s decision that can be construed as reflecting any aspect of plaintiffs’ opposition to AAG Kerwin’s cross-motion, though concealing that plaintiffs’ showing entitled them to a finding that AAG Kerwin’s invocation of a defense of standing was a sanctionable deceit.²

And, notwithstanding Judge Hartman acknowledges, by her first sentence, that this is a citizen-taxpayer action, the decision conceals her violation of the expedition commanded by State Finance Law §123-c(4),³ being rendered 88 days after the September 1, 2017 date that plaintiffs’ June 12, 2017 order to show cause and AAG Kerwin’s July 21, 2017 cross-motion were fully-submitted – in other words, four weeks beyond the 60-day limit for determining motions in ordinary actions (CPLR §2219(a)) – and this on top of the fact that in signing plaintiffs’ June 12, 2017 order to show cause, Judge Hartman defeated its very purpose by fixing a return date that was six weeks away – giving defendants more than twice the time they would have had had plaintiffs proceeded by a mailed notice of motion. (CPLR §2214(b)).⁴

The three remaining sentences of Judge Hartman’s first paragraph (at p. 2) read:

“In its December 21, 2016 Decision and Order, the Court granted in part defendants’ pre-answer motion and dismissed nine of ten causes of action, but denied the motion

² See, fn. 6, *infra*.

³ State Finance Law §123-c(4) reads: “An action under the provisions of this article shall be heard upon such notice to such officer or employee as the court, justice or judge shall direct, and shall be promptly determined. The action shall have preference over all other causes in all courts”

⁴ The facts – and manipulations – pertaining to the six-week return date that Judge Hartman gave defendants in signing plaintiffs’ June 12, 2017 order to show cause are recited by plaintiff Sassower’s August 25, 2017 reply affidavit, at ¶¶5, 8, 9, 11.

with respect to the cause of action challenging the 2015 legislation. On May 5, 2017, this Court issued a Decision and Order denying plaintiffs' application for disqualification and reargument, renewal, and vacatur of the Court's December 21, 2016 Decision and Order. On that same date, the Court issued an Amended Decision and Order correcting the recitation of papers considered in the December 21, 2016 Decision and Order."

The recital of these three decisions, as if legitimate, is also a deceit – as they are judicial frauds, so-established by plaintiffs' analysis of each, focally presented by their June 12, 2017 order to show cause and August 25, 2017 reply papers.

Suffice to add that Judge Hartman's assertion that her May 5, 2017 amended decision "correct[ed] the recitation of papers considered in the December 21, 2016 Decision and Order" – implying that the recitation there had been erroneous – is false. As highlighted by plaintiffs' February 15, 2017 order to show cause (at ¶7) and its annexed Exhibit U "legal autopsy"/analysis (at pp. 2, 23-24), the December 21, 2016 decision contained NO recitation of "papers considered" – a fact acknowledged by the May 5, 2017 decision itself (at p. 2).

The second paragraph (at pp. 2-3) disposes of plaintiffs' June 12, 2017 order to show cause, by four sentences, as follows:

"Plaintiff now moves, by order to show cause, for disqualification, reargument, renewal, and vacatur of the Court's May 5, 2017 Decision and Order and the May 5, 2017 Amended Decision and Order. Once again plaintiff has failed to establish matters of fact or law that the Court overlooked or misrepresented that would warrant reargument, or new facts that would warrant renewal (*see* CPLR 2221 [d, [e]]). Nor has she established grounds for disqualification and vacatur (*see Matter of Maron v. Silver*, 14 NY3d 230, 249 [2012] [Rule of Necessity]; *Pines v. State of N.Y.*, 115 AD3d 80, 90-91 [2d Dept 2014] [same], *appeal dismissed* 23 NY3d 982 [2014]). Plaintiff's motion is therefore denied."

In other words, Judge Hartman denies plaintiffs' June 12, 2017 order to show cause in completely conclusory fashion:

- without identifying ANY of the facts, law, or legal argument presented by plaintiffs' June 12, 2017 order to show cause and August 25, 2017 reply papers;
- without identifying defendants' response thereto; and
- without identifying plaintiffs' request that she make disclosure of her financial interest and relationships with defendants, of which she made none.

As for Judge Hartman's citations to *Maron v. Silver* and *Pines v. State* for the "Rule of Necessity", which she precedes by an inferential "see",⁵ such has no applicability to Judge Hartman's disqualification for ACTUAL bias, as manifested by each and every one her decisions; no applicability to Judge Hartman's disqualification based on her personal and professional relationships with defendants, including defendants Cuomo and Schneiderman for whom she worked in the attorney general's office; and no applicability to Judge Hartman's disqualification for the HUGE financial interest she shares with other judges – inasmuch as her May 5, 2017 decision LIES that she has NO financial interest.

The third paragraph (at p. 3), consisting of five sentences, disposes of AAG Kerwin's July 21, 2017 cross-motion, as follows:

"Respondents, having answered, cross-move for summary judgment on the sole remaining cause of action, both for lack of standing and on the merits, and for sanctions against plaintiff. Defendants waived their right to raise standing as a defense by failing to raise it in their pre-answer motion to dismiss or answer (*see Matter of Plainview-Old Bethpage Congress of Teachers v. NY State Health Ins. Plan*, 140 AD3d 1329, 1330 [3d Dept 2016]; *Schulz v Silver*, 212 AD2d 293, 296 [3d Dept 1995]). In any event, plaintiff has asserted a sufficient nexus to the fiscal activity of the State to confer standing under State Finance Law §123-b(1) (*see Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce v Pataki*, 100 NY2d 801, 813-814 [2003]).^{fn1} But, because defendants have demonstrated entitlement to judgment as a matter of law and plaintiff has not raised a material issue of fact in opposition, the motion for summary judgment is granted. The motion for sanctions, however, is denied."

Judge Hartman here conceals that AAG Kerwin's July 21, 2017 cross-motion for summary judgment was combined with her opposition to plaintiffs' June 12, 2017 order to show cause – and was fashioned throughout on falsehood and deceit, including as to standing and sanctions,⁶ so-demonstrated by plaintiffs' August 25, 2017 reply/opposition papers, whose appended "legal autopsy"/analysis of Judge Hartman's June 26, 2017 decision reinforced that it was plaintiffs, not defendants, who were entitled to summary judgment on their sixth cause of action. Judge Hartman, however, makes NO mention of plaintiffs' August 25, 2017 reply/opposition papers – other than in her last page listing of "Papers Considered".

⁵ The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation (18th ed. 2004), at p. 4: "Use see to introduce an authority that clearly supports, but does not directly state, the proposition".

⁶ *See*, with respect to standing, plaintiffs' August 25, 2017 reply/opposition memorandum of law, at pp. 27-29 and, with respect to sanctions, pp. 8, 9-10, 35-45.

The Decision's So-Called "Procedural Background" (at pp. 3-4)

By a four-sentence paragraph beneath a section titled "Procedural Background", Judge Hartman disposes of sub-cause E of plaintiffs' sixth cause of action.⁷ She states:

"By Decision and Order dated December 21, 2016, as amended on May 5 2017, the Court dismissed all of the complaint's causes of action but the sixth, which challenged as unconstitutional the 2015 legislation that created the Commission on Legislative, Judicial and Executive Compensation (Commission) (L 2015, ch 60, Part E §3[5]; S4610/A6721 2015). In its Decision and Order dated June 26, 2017, the Court denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the sixth cause of action. In that decision, the Court divided the sixth cause of action into six sub-causes, labelled A-E. As the Court held, the law of the case disposes of Sub-Cause E – allegations that the budget bill that created the Commission was procured by fraud and in violation of due process failed to state a cause of action. The remaining sub-causes must also be resolved in favor of defendants."

This so-called "Procedural Background" is materially false. The sixth cause of action of plaintiffs' September 2, 2016 verified complaint (¶¶59-68), preserved by Judge Hartman's December 21, 2016 decision, contained five sections. Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on all five by their March 29, 2017 order to show cause – and AAG Lynch, in the absence of any defense, purported by her April 21, 2017 opposition papers that the December 21, 2016 decision had preserved only the first and third sections – a fraud exposed by plaintiffs' May 15, 2017 reply memorandum of law (at pp. 16-18).

By her June 26, 2017 decision, Judge Hartman denied plaintiffs' March 29, 2017 order to show cause without identifying ANY of the facts, law, or legal argument presented therein or by their May 15, 2017 reply papers. The decision did not "divide" the sixth cause of action into six sub-causes. It simply substituted the nomenclature of sub-causes for sections, of which there were five, not six, denominated A-E. And, in the complete absence of any grounds for denying plaintiffs summary judgment on their sub-cause E, adopted AAG Lynch's deceit that it had not been preserved by the December 21, 2016 decision, stating:

"The final allegation in plaintiff's sixth cause of action is that the budget bills creating the Commission were enacted fraudulently and in violation of due process. These allegations have already been rejected by the Court in its Amended Decision and Order dated December 21, 2016." (June 26, 2017 decision, at p. 10).

⁷ Plaintiffs' sub-cause E is entitled "Chapter 60, Part E of the Laws of 2015 is Unconstitutional because Budget Bill #S4610-A/A.6721-A was Procured Fraudulently and Without Legislative Due Process" (September 2, 2016 verified complaint, ¶68).

Plaintiffs responded, by their “legal autopsy”/analysis of the June 26, 2017 decision – annexed as Exhibit I to their August 25, 2017 reply/opposition – as follows (at p. 24):

“This is outright fraud. The December 21, 2016 decision does not ‘reject[]’ sub-cause E – and Judge Hartman does not identify where and by what language her December 21, 2016 decision does so. Indeed, her summarizations of her December 21, 2016 decision, at the outset of the June 26, 2017 decision (at p. 2) and at the outset of her May 5, 2017 decision (at p. 1), also do not purport that the sixth cause of action was not fully preserved by her December 21, 2016 decision. That she here makes such bald claim is completely contrived – and replicates AAG Lynch’s deceit, by her April 21, 2017 opposition papers, that only the first and third of the sub-causes had been preserved, exposed by pages 16-18 of plaintiffs’ May 15, 2017 reply memorandum of law, to which Judge Hartman makes no reference. Such deceit is because – as the allegations of sub-cause E plainly reveal – plaintiffs’ have a summary judgment entitlement to a declaration of unconstitutionality based thereon.”

The accuracy of this was not denied or disputed by AAG Kerwin, who chose not to interpose reply papers. And Judge Hartman’s November 28, 2017 decision does not deny or dispute its accuracy either. Rather, by this paragraph of “Procedural Background”, she conceals that her euphemistically described “law of the case” is her December 21, 2016 decision; that it did not dismiss plaintiffs’ sub-cause E as having “failed to state a cause of action”; and that the record establishes plaintiffs’ entitlement to summary judgment, *as a matter of law*, on their sub-cause E: AAG Kerwin having furnished NO evidence to substantiate the bald denials of her answer and, by her litigation fraud, reinforcing that she has NONE.

The decision then continues with a further paragraph (at p. 4), seemingly still part of “Procedural Background”, consisting of two generic sentences about the “strong presumption of the constitutionality of legislative enactments”. These sentences materially replicate what the June 26, 2017 decision had recited (at p. 5) under its title heading “Motion for Summary Judgment”.

The November 28, 2017 decision presents no comparable “Summary Judgment” title heading. Nor does it recite the threshold procedural standards governing summary judgment, enunciated by the “Summary Judgment” section of the June 26, 2017 decision, *to wit*:

“The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of submitting evidence in admissible form demonstrating entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Once the moving party has met its burden, the burden shifts to the party opposing summary judgment to submit evidence in admissible form that establishes that a material issue of fact exists (*Nomura Asset Capital Corp. v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP*, 26 NY3d 40, 49 [2015]; *Staunton v. Brooks*, 129 AD3d 1371, 1372 [3d Dept 2015]).”

Instead, the decision directly proceeds (at pp. 5-10) to three section headings for sub-causes A-D of plaintiffs' sixth cause of action, all seemingly part of "Procedural Background". None of these three sections furnish content consistent with the above-quoted procedure for granting summary judgment – a procedure that would have enabled the decision to substantiate the conclusory claim in its untitled prefatory third paragraph (at p. 3) that "defendants have demonstrated entitlement to judgment as a matter of law and plaintiff has not raised a material issue of fact in opposition" – a claim without the slightest basis in the record.

The Decision's "Sub-Causes A & B – Improper Delegation of Authority Claims"
(at pp. 5-6)

The deceit of Judge Hartman's three paragraphs pertaining to sub-causes A and B of plaintiffs' sixth cause of action begins with her section heading title "Sub-Causes A & B – Improper Delegation of Authority Claims", as the issue is NOT "Improper Delegation", but delegation that is unconstitutional, violating separation of powers and the presentment clause.⁸

"As a general rule, the lawmaking powers conferred upon the Senate and Assembly are exclusive, and the Legislature may neither abdicate its constitutional powers and duties nor delegate them to others."

...

"In the enactment of delegative statutes certain formalities must be met which are second only to the requirement that the function itself be one which is susceptible of delegation."

McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated, Book 1: Statutes, Chapter 1, §3 "Delegation of legislative power" (underlining added).

Because Judge Hartman has no answer to the separation of powers, presentment clause violations of sub-cause A (¶¶61-62), nor to the insufficiency of "safeguarding" provisions, which is sub-cause B (¶¶63-65), she combines these separate sub-causes – just as she had by her June 26, 2017 decision (at pp 5-7) under a materially different, but more accurate, section heading: "Sub-Causes A and B – Separation of Powers Claims". She then conceals ALL the allegations of these two separate sub-causes. Thus, she does not identify the specific delegation of legislative power which sub-cause A particularizes as unconstitutional, this being the "force of law" power of the Commission's judicial salary recommendations, superseding existing law – nor any of the facts, law, or legal argument furnished by plaintiffs in substantiation. Nor does she identify any of the deficiencies identified by sub-cause B as rendering the statute unconstitutional, over and above its unconstitutional delegation,

⁸ Plaintiffs' sub-cause A is entitled "Chapter 60, Part E of the Laws of 2015 Unconstitutionally Delegates Legislative Power by Giving the Commission's Judicial Salary Recommendations 'the Force of Law'" (September 2, 2016 verified complaint, ¶¶61-62, underlining added). Sub-cause B is entitled "Chapter 60, Part E of the Laws of 2015 Unconstitutionally Delegates Legislative Power Without Safeguarding Provisions" (September 2, 2016 verified complaint, ¶¶63-65, underlining added).

to wit, the inadequacy of such statutory “safeguards” as the Commission’s membership and the six enumerated factors the Commission is mandated to evaluate in making its salary recommendations.

AAG Kerwin’s July 21, 2017 cross-motion for summary judgment had also concealed ALL the allegations of sub-causes A and B and materially rested on Judge Hartman’s June 26, 2017 decision – but all this is concealed by the November 28, 2017 decision. Likewise, the ENTIRETY of plaintiffs’ rebuttal by their August 25, 2017 memorandum of law (at pp. 28-32), and encompassing their “legal autopsy”/analysis of the June 26, 2017 decision, whose pages 16-20 rebutted Judge Hartman’s denial of summary judgment to plaintiffs on sub-causes A and B.

It is because plaintiffs’ August 25, 2017 rebuttal so resoundingly established no basis for anything but summary judgment to plaintiffs on their sub-causes A and B that the three paragraphs that Judge Hartman offers up (at pp. 5-6) consist, virtually entirely, of selective quotations and paraphrasing of the statute and generic, unresponsive citations. This includes her bald citation (at p. 6) to “*McKinney v. Commr. of the N.Y State Dept. of Health*, 41 AD3d 252, 253 [1st Dept 2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 815 [2007], appeal dismissed 9 NY3d 891 [2007]” for the proposition “Enabling statutes even broader than this one have been found constitutional” and “*compare St. Joseph’s Hospital v Novello*, 43 AD3d 139 [4th Dept 2007] [declining to address constitutionality of delegation of authority that allowed for de facto legislative veto]” – nowhere addressing plaintiffs’ showing that these decisions establish their summary judgment entitlement, demonstrated by: (1) the very allegations of their sub-causes A and B (¶¶390-391, 393, 394-395); (2) their September 30, 2017 reply memorandum of law (at pp. 29-31); (3) their May 15, 2017 reply memorandum of law (at p. 21); and (4) their “legal autopsy”/analysis of the June 26, 2017 decision (pp. 16-20), on which their August 25, 2017 memorandum of law additionally relied (pp. 28-32).

The Decision’s “Sub-Cause C – New York Constitution Article XIII, Section 7”
(at p. 7)

Judge Hartman’s single paragraph under this heading, granting summary judgment to defendants on sub-cause C of plaintiffs’ sixth cause of action,⁹ rests on her unspecified “earlier decision” – this being her June 26, 2017 decision, in which her argument was entirely *sua sponte*, having not been advanced by defendants – a fact pointed out by plaintiffs’ “legal autopsy”/analysis (at pp. 20-21), furnished by their August 25, 2017 opposition/reply.

The Decision’s “Sub-Cause D – Article VII, Sections 2, 3, and 6”
(at pp. 7-9)

Notwithstanding the five paragraphs under this subheading, only one actually disposes of sub-cause D of plaintiffs’ sixth cause of action.¹⁰

⁹ Plaintiffs’ Sub-cause C is entitled “Chapter 60, Part E of the Laws of 2015 Violates Article XIII, §7 of the New York State Constitution” (September 2, 2016 verified complaint, ¶66).

¹⁰ Plaintiffs’ sub-cause D is entitled “Chapter 60, Part E of the Laws of 2015 Violates Article VII, §6 of

The first two paragraphs recite the allegations of sub-cause D in a general, truncated fashion. The third paragraph then states (at pp. 8-9):

“Assuming without deciding justiciability (*see Pataki v. N.Y. State Assembly*, 4 NY3d 75, 97 [2004]; *Saxton v Carey*, 44 NY2d 545, 549-551 [1978]), this sub-cause must also be denied. With regard to timeliness, Article VII, Section 3 allows the submission of budget bills ‘at any time’ with the consent of the Legislature. Although no formal consent appears in the record, the Legislature’s consideration and passage of the bill is effective consent in itself. In any event, the 30-day timeframe appears to be precatory, not mandatory. Unlike, for instance, Article III, Section 14, which states that ‘[n]o bill shall be passed or become a law unless it has been printed and upon the desk of the members, in its final form, at least three calendar legislative days prior to its final passage,’ Article VII, Section 6 contains no such mandatory language (*cf. (Maybe v State*, 4 NY3d 415, 419-421 [2005] [holding that rationale underlying a Governor’s statement of necessity to allow a bill to be passed without being before the Legislature for three days is not susceptible to judicial review]). Nor does the Commission bill violate Article VII, Section 6 of the State Constitution. The creation of the Commission relates specifically to items of appropriation in the 2015 budget for judicial and legislative pay and is not ‘essentially non-budgetary’ (*Pataki*, 4 NY3d at 98-99; *see Schuyler v S. Mall Constructors*, 32 AD2d 454 [3d Dept 1969]).”

Aside from being materially different from Judge Hartman’s June 26, 2017 decision denying plaintiffs summary judgment on sub-cause D, which, as detailed by plaintiffs’ “legal autopsy”/analysis (at pp. 21-23), was completely *sua sponte* and fraudulent, this paragraph – essentially abandoning the deceptions of the June 26, 2017 decision – is also *sua sponte* and completely fraudulent.

As to justiciability, Judge Hartman does not decide it because, as reflected by *Winner v. Cuomo*, 176 AD2d 60 (3rd Dept. 1992), and *Pataki v. Assembly*, 4 NY3d 75 (2004), cited and quoted in plaintiffs’ sub-cause D (at p. 62), as well as *Saxton v Carey*, 44 NY2d 545, 551 (1978), and a host of other cases including *Korn v Gulotta*, 72 NY2d 363, 369-370 (1988); *New York Bankers Assn v. Wetzler*, 81 NY2d 98, 102 (1993); and *King v. Cuomo*, 81 NY2d 247, 251 (1993), plaintiffs’ challenges based on Article VII, §3 and §6 are justiciable.

As to the violation of Article VII, §3, Judge Hartman states (at p. 8) that the record before her contains “no formal consent”. Yet, rather than acknowledging that such PRECLUDES summary judgment to defendants, she purports – *unsupported by any law* – that “consideration and passage of the bill is effective consent” – completely ignoring that the facts in the record PRECLUDE “effective consent”, *as a matter of law*. These are the facts detailed by sub-cause E (¶¶413-423) as to the fraud

the New York State Constitution – and, Additionally, Article VII, §§2 and 3” (September 2, 2016 verified complaint, ¶67).

by which Budget Bill #S4610-A/A.6721-A was introduced and enacted – facts unrefuted by defendants – and which, by the particulars and evidence recited, are clearly irrefutable and dispositive of plaintiffs’ entitlement to summary judgment on sub-cause E,¹¹ as well as on sub-cause D pertaining to the Article VII, §3 violation.

Having neither “formal consent”, nor “effective consent” – in other words, in the complete absence of the “consent” requisite to defeating plaintiffs’ entitlement to summary judgment on sub-cause D based on violation of Article VII, §3 – Judge Hartman offers up the deceit that consent is not necessary because “the 30-day timeframe appears to be precatory, not mandatory” (at p. 8). This is utterly false. The definition of precatory is “a wish or advisory suggestion which does not have the force of a demand or a request which under the law must be obeyed”¹². There is nothing in the 30-day time frame of Article VII, §3 that fits that description – as Judge Hartman may be presumed to know in not quoting or analyzing the pertinent text of Article VII, §3, which is clear and unambiguous. It reads:

“At the time of submitting the budget to the legislature the governor shall submit a bill or bills containing all the proposed appropriations and reappropriations included in the budget and the proposed legislation, if any, recommended therein.

The governor may at any time within thirty days thereafter and, with the consent of the legislature, at any time before the adjournment thereof, amend or supplement the budget and submit amendments to any bills submitted by him or her or submit supplemental bills.”

The meaning of “shall” is mandatory:

“The courts ordinarily...view the word ‘shall’ as an indication of the mandatory character of the provision.” 20 New York Jurisprudence 2nd, §39: “Provision as mandatory or directory”.

Were the second sentence to be only “precatory”, it would undo the mandatory nature of the first sentence AND render meaningless the distinction in the second sentence for the Governor’s amending and supplementing before and after the 30 days.

“The starting point for any constitutional question must be the language of the constitution itself. The same general rules that govern the construction and

¹¹ McKinney’s Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated, Book 1: Statutes – Chapter 2, §11: “Legislative procedure generally”: “...the Constitution not only permits, but it requires an examination into the procedure followed in the consideration of a bill.”, citing *Franklin Nat. Bank of Long Island v Clark*, 1961, 26 Misc.2d 724, 212 N.Y.S.2d 942, motion denied 217 N.Y.S.2d 615.

¹² See also Black’s Law Dictionary (eighth edition: 2004): “requesting, recommending, or expressing a desire for action, but usu. in a nonbinding way”.

interpretation of statutes and written instruments generally apply to, and control in, the interpretation of written constitutions.

... there is no room for application of rules of construction so as to alter a constitutional provision that is not ambiguous...”

20 New York Jurisprudence 2nd, §17 “Mode of construction: applicability of principles of statutory construction”

“...When the language of a constitutional provision is plain and unambiguous, full effect should be given to the intention of the framers as indicated by the language employed and approved by the people.

The courts should not permit explicit language of the constitution to be rendered meaningless, and, in its construction of clear constitutional and statutory provisions, a court may not read out any requirement.”, 20 New York Jurisprudence 2nd, §25 “Conformity to language”;

“It is a well-settled rule, in accord with obvious good sense, that in construing the language of the constitution, the courts should give the language its ordinary, natural, plain meaning. The words of the constitution must be taken to mean what they most directly and aptly express in their usual and popular significance...It is not allowable to interpret what has no need of interpretation or, when the words have a definite precise meaning, to go elsewhere in search of conjecture in order to restrict or extend the meaning.” 20 New York Jurisprudence 2nd, §27 “Ordinary meaning”;

“In dealing with constitutional language, the courts are not inclined to adopt technical or strained constructions. Neither will they give to the language of the constitution a construction that leads to manifestly unintended results or makes a constitutional provision absurd. ..” 20 New York Jurisprudence 2nd, §29 “Strained interpretations; absurd results”

In lieu of any recitation of the principles governing interpretation of constitutional provisions, or any textual analysis of Article VII, §3, or any citation to caselaw or treatise authority for the seemingly first-ever proposition that “the 30-day timeframe appears to be precatory”, Judge Hartman substitutes (at pp. 8-9) a truncated quote of a completely separate constitutional provision, Article III, §14, quoting the beginning language of its first sentence as to its mandatory three-day aging requirement for bills, but not the balance, which sets forth the requisite for dispensing with it:

“unless the governor, or the acting governor, shall have certified, under his or her hand and the seal of the state, the facts which in his or her opinion necessitate an immediate vote thereon, in which case it must nevertheless be upon the desks of the members in final form, not necessarily printed, before its final passage”.

She then crowns her expurgation of Article III, §14 with the assertion “Article VII, Section 6 contains no such mandatory language”, when at issue is Article VII, §3 – whose own language is no

less mandatory, so-revealed by its language, which she has not fully quoted and textual analysis she has not furnished.

As for her concluding citation (at p. 9), in a parenthesis, and by a *cf.*,¹³ to *Maybe v. State*, it has relevance ONLY to Article III, §14. Indeed, for *Maybe* to be relevant to Article VII, §3, it would have to stand for the proposition that Article III, §14 is not violated when there is NO message of necessity for a bill enacted without being on legislators' desk for three days – which it does NOT – and that the omission of a message of necessity for such bill is NOT justiciable – which it does NOT.

As to the violation of Article VII, §6, Judge Hartman disposes of it (at p. 9) in two conclusory sentences: the first simply declaring no violation, with the second purporting, without specificity, that “The creation of the Commission relates specifically to items of appropriation in the 2015 budget for judicial and legislative pay”. This is false – and Judge Hartman conspicuously does not identify where in the budget the purported “items of appropriation” might be found. There are no such “items of appropriation”, none were alleged by defendants, and sub-cause D, by its ¶407, contains the admission of the six legislative defendants who sponsored A.7997 that there was “no appropriation in the budget bill relating to the salary commission” – quoting their introducers' memorandum to A.7997, as follows:

“Article VII, Section 6 of the New York State Constitution states in relevant part that ‘(n)o provision shall be embraced in any appropriation bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation in the bill,’ yet there was no appropriation in the budget bill relating to the salary commission. Thus, this legislation was improperly submitted and considered by the legislature as an unconstitutional rider to a budget bill.”

Judge Hartman's citations to *Pataki*, 4 NY3d at 98-99, and *Schuyler v S. Mall Constructors*, 32 AD2d 454 [3d Dept 1969], reinforce the violation of Article VII, §6 which the six legislative defendants themselves revealed.

Having no facts and no law for granting summary judgment to defendants on sub-cause D, either as to their Article VII, §3 violation or their Article VII, §6 violation, Judge Hartman then whips out “prudential considerations”, stating, as follows, in a three-sentence paragraph (at p. 9):

“Prudential considerations further weigh against invading the province of the Governor and Legislature. ‘[T]he consequences of judicial second-guessing of the Governor's and the Legislature's choice’ to create the Commission by budget bill outside the 30-day window could be ‘draconian’ (*Maybe*, 4 NY3d at 420; *see Schulz v. State*, 81 NY2d 336, 348-349 [1993]). If the Court ‘accepted plaintiff's argument

¹³ According to The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation (18th ed. 2004, p. 47), *cf.* means: “Cited authority supports a proposition different from the main proposition but sufficiently analogous to lend support. Literally, ‘*cf.*’ means ‘compare.’ The citation's relevance will usually be clear to the reader only if it is explained. Parenthetical explanations, however brief, are therefore strongly recommended.”

here, any statute, no matter how important to the state,’ would be subject to invalidation if passed under similar circumstances (*Maybee*, 4 NY3d at 420).”

This is a conclusory deceit. Judge Hartman does not assert that a declaration striking down the commission statute as violative of Article VII, § 3 would be “draconian”, but only that it “could be ‘draconian’”. She provides not a single fact in substantiation and, indeed, its consequences would be beneficial to everyone except those whose “gravy train” of larcenous salary increases would come to an end: Judge Hartman, her judicial brethren, and district attorneys whose salaries are linked to judicial salaries. The sixth, seventh, and eighth causes of action of plaintiffs’ September 2, 2017 verified complaint (¶¶59-68; ¶¶69-76; ¶¶77-80) furnish a multitude of grounds mandating invalidation of the statute – as to which the record establishes plaintiffs’ entitlement to summary judgment on all three causes, *as a matter of law*.¹⁴

Judge Hartman then finishes off with a further paragraph (at pp. 9-10) – seemingly embracing the entirety of plaintiffs’ sixth cause of action, not just its sub-cause D:

“Finally, the particular circumstances of this case also counsel restraint. Plaintiff did not commence this action until September 2016, well after the Commission bill was signed by the Governor in April 2015, the Commission issued its Final Report on Judicial Compensation on December 24, 2015, and its recommendations took on the force of law on April 1, 2016. While the Court recognizes that invalidation of the Commission and of the raises that followed is precisely the relief plaintiff seeks, the relief she requests in her sixth cause of action must be denied (*see Schulz*, 81 NY2d 336, 348-349 [1993]).”

This factual recitation infers, without so-stating and by citing *Schulz*, that plaintiffs did not timely commence their litigation challenge and are barred by laches. This is completely false. On March 31, 2015, the date Budget Bill #S.4610/A.6721 was introduced, amended, and passed by the Senate, and in the wee morning hours of April 1, 2015, passed by the Assembly – repealing Chapter 567 of the Laws of 2010 that had created the Commission on Judicial Compensation and replacing it with a materially identical statute creating the Commission on Legislative, Judicial and Executive Compensation – plaintiffs already had a citizen-taxpayer action, which they had commenced on March 28, 2014, challenging Chapter 567 of the Laws of 2010 and the August 29, 2011 report the Commission on Judicial Compensation had rendered. On September 22, 2015, by opposition/cross-motion papers¹⁵, they sought a summary judgment declaration of unconstitutionality as to Chapter

¹⁴ Judge Hartman’s fraudulent dismissal of plaintiffs’ seventh and eight causes of action on the *sua sponte* ground that the Commission on Legislative, Judicial and Executive Compensation was not a party – for which she furnished neither law nor argument – is highlighted at p. 16 of plaintiffs’ “legal autopsy”/analysis of her December 21, 2016 decision and further particularized at pp. 9-10 of plaintiffs’ “legal autopsy”/analysis of her June 26, 2017 decision.

¹⁵ See plaintiffs’ September 22, 2015 memorandum of law (at p. 48) and plaintiff Sassower’s September 22, 2015 affidavit (at ¶8).

567 of the Laws of 2010, identifying that it had been repealed and replaced by the materially identical Chapter 60, Part E of the Laws of 2015. In further support of their summary judgment entitlement, plaintiffs' November 5, 2015 reply papers¹⁶ furnished the introducers' memorandum to A.7997, the bill to amend Chapter 60, Part E, of the Laws of 2015, by, *inter alia*, removing the "force of law" aspect of the commission's salary recommendations – and furnishing, additionally, citation to, and quotation from, the New York City Bar's *amicus curiae* brief to the Court of Appeals in *McKinney v. Commissioner of the State of New York Department of Health* (15 Misc. 3d 743 (S.Ct. Bronx 2006), *affm'd* 41 A.D.3d 252 (1st Dept. 2007), appeal dismissed, 9 NY3d 891 (2007), appeal denied, 9 NY3d 815; motion granted, 9 NY3d 986), as to the unconstitutionality of the similar "force of law" provision in Chapter 63, Part E, of the Laws of 2005. At that point, the Commission on Legislative, Judicial and Executive Compensation was already in violation of Chapter 60, Part E of the Laws of 2015 – its full complement of seven members not having been appointed until October 31, 2015. Three weeks later, on November 30, 2015, at the Commission on Legislative, Judicial and Executive Compensation's one and only hearing on judicial compensation, plaintiff Sassower, in support of her testimony, handed up the pertinent lawsuit papers to establish plaintiffs' summary judgment entitlement to declarations of unconstitutionality with respect to Chapter 567 of the Laws of 2010 – whose effect would be the voiding of Chapter 60, Part E, of the Laws of 2015. The Commission ignored and concealed the entirety of plaintiff Sassower's testimony in rendering its December 24, 2015 report, and materially rested on the Commission on Judicial Compensation's August 29, 2011 report to recommend its own further "force of law" judicial salary increases. Immediately, plaintiffs sought oversight from defendant Chief Judge (nominee) DiFiore and, thereafter, the legislative defendants and, in the complete absence of any oversight, on March 23, 2016, brought an emergency order to show cause, with TRO, to enjoin disbursement of monies to pay for the "force of law" judicial salary increases for fiscal year 2016-2017 recommended by the December 24, 2015 report, stating:

“3. ... ‘the force of law’ judicial salary increases recommended by the Commission on Legislative, Judicial and Executive Compensation suffer from the identical constitutional and statutory violations as ‘the force of law’ judicial salary increases recommended by the Commission on Judicial Compensation.

4. It would be wasteful to bring a separate citizen taxpayer action when the facts and law are identical – and when any such separate citizen-taxpayer action would doubtless be assigned to the Court as a related proceeding.”¹⁷ (underlining in the original).

In support, plaintiffs furnished a March 23, 2016 second supplemental verified complaint pertaining to fiscal year 2016-2017, which they sought leave to file. Despite plaintiffs' entitlement, *as a matter of law*, to the TRO relief requested, Judge McDonough denied same – and then delayed decision on

¹⁶ See plaintiffs' November 5, 2015 reply/opposition memorandum of law (at pp. 19-25) and plaintiff Sassower's November 5, 2015 reply/opposing affidavit, at ¶¶3-8.

¹⁷ See plaintiffs' March 23, 2016 emergency order to show cause, with TRO, at ¶3.

the fully-submitted order to show cause until July 15, 2016, when he denied it, in its entirety, in the same decision as denied, in its entirety, plaintiffs' September 22, 2015 cross-motion. The fraudulence of this decision, which Judge McDonough corrected by an August 1, 2016 amended decision, was demonstrated by plaintiffs' "legal autopsy"/analysis thereof, annexed as Exhibit G to their September 2, 2016 verified complaint commencing the second citizen-taxpayer action – a complaint whose sixth causes of action (§§59-68) rests on the thirteenth cause of action of the March 23, 2016 verified second supplemental complaint (§§385-423), annexed thereto as Exhibit A.

The Decision's Ordering Paragraphs
(at p. 10)

Judge Hartman's decision concludes with four ordering paragraphs – the third being misleading and fourth being fraudulent.¹⁸

The third ordering paragraph, "ORDERED that summary judgment is granted in favor of defendants", is overbroad. Judge Hartman granted defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs' sixth cause of action – with this limited to sub-causes A-D because sub-cause E was allegedly dismissed by her December 21, 2016 decision for failure to state a cause of action.

As for the fourth ordering paragraph,

"ORDERED AND ADJUDGED AND DECLARED that plaintiff has not demonstrated that the Laws of 2015, ch 60, Part E §3 [5], which created the Commission on Legislative, Judicial & Executive Compensation, is facially unconstitutional",

it is fraudulent. Plaintiffs demonstrated their entitlement to declarations that Chapter 60, Part E of the Laws of 2015 is unconstitutional, *as written* and by its introduction and enactment, by sub-causes A, B, D, and E of their sixth cause of action, if not also by their sub-cause C.

The Decision's CPLR §2219(a) Recitation of "Papers Considered"
(at p. 11)

Justice Hartman ends her decision by a CPLR §2219(a) listing of "Papers Considered". No fair and impartial tribunal could have "Considered" the listed papers and rendered the November 28, 2017 decision. As hereinabove demonstrated, it is a judicial fraud, proven, *readily*, by those very "Papers Considered".

¹⁸ As to the first ordering paragraph: "ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for disqualification, reargument, renewal and vacatur is denied", Judge Hartman identifies the disqualification sought as part of the first and second branches of plaintiffs' June 12, 2017 order to show cause, but not the disclosure also sought by the first branch – which she has implicitly denied.

As to the second ordering paragraph: "ORDERED that defendants' motion for sanctions is denied", Judge Hartman fails to identify that defendants' motion was actually a cross-motion, dated July 21, 2017.