About CJA
Our History
Our Mission
Who We Are
Awards & Honors

Published Pieces

Testimony

Judicial Selection
Federal
State-NY

Judicial Discipline
Federal
State-NY

Test Cases:
Federal (Mangano)
State (Commission)

"Disruption of Congress"
Paper Trail to Jail
Paper Trail from Jail
The Appeals

Judicial Compensation
Federal
State-NY

Elections:
Informing the Voters

Press Suppression

Suing The New York Times
Outreach
Background Paper Trail

Searching for Champions:
    (Correspondence):

Federal
NYS
Bar Associations
Academia
Organizations
Nader & Others
Citizens

Our Members' Efforts

Library

Join Us!

BUDGET RESOURCE PAGE: 
Constitutional, Statutory, & Rule Provisions,
Caselaw, Law Review articles, etc.
underlying
CJA's 1st & 2nd citizen-taxpayer actions

 

Constitutional provisions pertaining to the Budget
Article VII, §§1-7; Article IV,§7

Constitutional and statutory provisions pertaining to the timeliness
of the Governor's budget bills & legislation
Constitution, Article VII,§§2, 3; State Finance Law §22(16)

Constitutional, rule, and statutory provisions pertaining to openness
Article III, §10; Senate Rules XI, §1; V, §5d, §7; VI, §1; VIII, §3, §4, §5, §7;  IX, §6; XV;  
Assembly Rules II, §1; III, §2; IV, §2, §3; V, §2, §5; VI; Public Officers Law, Articles VI, VII

Senate & Assembly rules mandating memos, fiscal notes, impact statements
Senate Rule VII, §1; Senate Rule VIII, §7; Assembly Rule III, §1f, §2a;
Permanent Joint Senate/Assembly Rule I

Statutes pertaining to reappropriations -- & relevant constitutional provisions
State Finance Law §25, §43; Article III, §16

Statutory and rule provisions pertaining to legislative budget schedule
Legislative Law §53, §54-a; Senate-Assembly Joint Rule III; Assembly Rule I, §8

Statutory and rule provisions pertaining to budget conference committees
Legislative Law §54-a; Senate-Assembly Joint Rules III, II
Chapter 1 of the Laws of 2007

A-2755   S-1322

Statutes pertaining to legislative budget hearings
Legislative Law §31, §32-a

Senate & Assembly rules pertaining to amendments
Senate Rule VII, §4b; IX, §4; Assembly Rule III, §1f; Assembly Rule III, §6

Statutes mandating legislative reports on the budget
Legislative Law §54; State Finance Law §22-b

Senate & Assembly rules pertaining to oversight & annual reports
Senate Rule VIII, §4(c), §4(d); Assembly Rule IV, §1(d), §1(e), §4(b), §9

Constitutional provisions pertaining to messages of necessity
Article III, §14, Articles VII, §§4-5

 

See, also: "Albany's Dysfunction Denies Due Process"
Professor Eric Lane, Pace Law Review (2010)

click here for:  Rules Reform Resource Page
posting Brennan Center Reports --2004, 2006, 2008

Budget Cases

Pataki v. Assembly & Senate
Silver v. Pataki
Court of Appeals decision (2004)

briefs before Court of Appeals
[Silver] Silver's brief - March 26, 2004
[Silver] Senate brief - March 29, 2004
[Silver] Governor's brief - July 19, 2004
[Silver] Silver's reply brief - August 20, 2004

[Silver] Senate reply brief - August 20, 2004

[Pataki] Assembly brief - August 12, 2004
[Pataki] Senate brief - August 13, 2004
[Pataki] Governor's brief- October 20, 2004
[Pataki] Assembly reply brief - October 29. 2004
[Pataki] Senate reply brief - November 1, 2004

Pataki v. Assembly & Senate
Albany Supreme Court decision (Malone) (2002)
Appellate Division, Third Department decision (2004)

Silver v. Pataki
Manhattan Supreme Court decision (Lehner) (2002)
Appellate Division, First Department decision (2003)


"The New York State Budget Process and the Constitution:
Defining and Protecting the 'Delicate Balance of Power
",
Association of the Bar of the City of New York
(Committee on State Affairs),
58 The Record 345 (Oct. 2003)

Rockefeller Institute --
Budgets & the Balance of Power:
The Lasting Impact of Silver v. Pataki &
How It Shapes the Future of Government in New York State (June 16, 2015)


Albany Law School-Institute of Legal Studies
continuing legal education

 

New York State Bankers Association v. Wetzler
Court of Appeals decision (1993)

 

Winner v. Cuomo
Appellate Division, 3rd Dept decision (1992)

 

Saxton v. Carey
Court of Appeals decision (1978)
Appellate Division, 3rd Dept decision (1978)


Levitt v. Rockefeller
Supreme Court decision (1972)

Hidley v. Rockefeller
Court of Appeals decision(1971)
Appellate Division, 3rd Dept decision (1971)

Tremaine 2
Court of Appeals decision (1939)
Appellate Division, 3rd Dept decision (1939)


Tremaine I 
Court of Appeals decision (1929)
Appellate Division 3rd Dept decision (1929)

  

-----------------


As to the unconstitutionality of three-men-in-a-room
budget deal-making


King v. Cuomo -- Court of Appeals decision (1993)
Seymour v. Cuomo -- Appellate Division 3rd Dept decision (1992)

See, also "The Anti-Corruption Principle",
Professor Zephyr Teachout, Cornell Law Review (2009)

 

other relevant cases:

Michael Cohen v. New York State
Court of Appeals decision (1999)
NY Supreme Court decision (1999)

Bellacosa/Ct of Appeals: 

The Governor proposes a budget, recommending appropriations (NY Const, art VII, §3), and the Legislature may strike out or reduce items, as well as propose its own additions (NY Const, art VII, §4). The Governor's proposals, if enacted by the Legislature (both Houses acting in harmony), shall become law without further Executive action; appropriations for the Legislature and Judiciary and any proposed additional appropriations, however, are subject to the Governor's further action (NY Const, art VII, §4).

 

Chapter 635 of the Laws of 1998 adds procedural oil to this delicately calibrated mechanism. The Legislature, as a Branch of government, must have "finally acted on" the appropriations submitted by the Governor before individuallegislators may be paid. The inducement does not require that the Legislature pass the Governor's budget; only that it pass a budget (see, Senate Debate Transcripts, pp 6622–6629, 6625–6626, Bill Jacket, L 1998, ch 635).
...

Just as the plaintiffs theorize about scenarios where the Governor may "force" legislators into budgetary submission, competing hypotheses may be composed. For example, the Legislature could simply have stricken some of the Governor's proposed appropriations and offered no additions of its own. The State would then have had an instant budget over which the Governor would have had no subsequent, separate, constitutionally assigned role."


Korn v. Gulotta, 72 NY2d 363 (1988)

 "A budget is a statement of the financial position of the government, for a definite period of time, based upon an estimate of proposed expenditures and anticipated revenues... . The method by which public budgets are prepared is governed by the State Constitution and the applicable State statutes. The requirements contained in those documents are not particularly burdensome and permit the executive and legislative officials considerable freedom of action in implementing governmental operations and programs and providing for the revenues to fund them. The legal requirements they contain, however, are grounded in the general principles of fiscal responsibility and the accountability that underpins the regulation of all public conduct and they must be followed."

      dissent: "where a budget is prepared in clear violation of a statutory or constitutional mandate, it is subject to review by the courts (see, Wein v Carey, 41 N.Y.2d 498; Matter of Block v Sprague, 285 N.Y. 69)."

Block v. Sprague, 285 NY 69 (1941)

Wein v. State of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 136 (1976)

Wein v. Carey, 41 N.Y.2d 498 (1977)  -- "constitutionally mandated and meticulously directed process (NY Const, art VII, §§ 1-4)"

---------------------------

*    *    *

 

 

 

Governor Cuomo's April 13, 2016 press release "Governor Cuomo Vetoes 210 Legislative Additions to the 2016-2017 Legislative Budget"     specifications of vetoes

 

    NEW YORK STATE COMPTROLLER --

Comptroller DiNapoli's May 2016 "Report on the State Fiscal Year 2016-2017 Enacted Budget":

"Message from the Comptroller"

        "Ideally,a governmental budget is created with full public transparency. But nine of the ten bills that make up this year’s Budget were passed by the Legislature soon after final amendments were added and bills were printed, using gubernatorial “messages of necessity” that bypass the three-day waiting period normally required by the State Constitution. The Legislature’s budget conference committee process was incomplete again this year. In many ways, transparency was sorely lacking.
         "A budget should provide full and clear information about how the public’s dollars will be allocated and used, and an explanation of the benefits that are expected to result. The Enacted Budget could have done more to meet these goals...."

"Executive Summary", at p. 2

"The Budget includes a number of provisions that raise concerns regarding transparency, accountability and oversight. Bills addressing major areas of public interest were passed with only minimal information on their content disclosed. The rushed passage of these important bills denied the public the opportunity to gain a full understanding of the contents and the financial, programmatic and other impacts such agreements could have before their enactment. While fiscal estimates for certain changes from the Executive Budget were made public, the Budget was adopted with minimal disclosure as to its overall fiscal impact. The Legislature’s Joint Budget Conference Committee process was started, and the Legislature reported that $277 million was to be allocated by subcommittees for various programmatic areas, but no information as to specific outcomes of the conference committee process was made available."  


"Transparency and Accountability", at p. 44

        "The Enacted Budget included several proposals from the Executive Budget, as well as additional provisions added as a result of budget negotiations, that reduce government transparency, accountability, and oversight. Also, while the Budget was essentially timely, with final legislative action on appropriation bills occurring on April 1, transparency with respect to both process and content was sacrificed. The following summary provides an overview of these areas of concern.

Opaque budget process
        The Legislature’s Joint Budget Conference subcommittee process was designed in part to provide public disclosure of budget negotiations. The Legislature reported that $277 million was to be allocated by the substantive subcommittees for various programmatic areas. There were public meetings where changes to the Budget were discussed, but final conclusions were not reached publicly, and final subcommittee reports were not released. In the end, the Director of the Budget reported that the Legislature had provided additions and restorations totaling approximately $1.4 billion.
        All major budget bills, with the exception of the debt service budget bill, were passed under messages of necessity and without time for appropriate review. The rushed passage of these important bills denied the public – and may have denied some legislators – the opportunity to get a full understanding of the agreements being reached and the financial, programmatic, and other impacts such agreements could have before their enactment."
 

Comptroller DiNapoli's April 1, 2015 "Report on the State Fiscal Year 2015-2016 Enacted Budget"

at p. 2

"The Enacted Budget’s extensive use of lump-sum appropriations for Executive and Legislative initiatives raises questions of accountability and transparency. In most cases, these programs contain only minimal criteria for awards and few, if any, requirements for public reporting on the programs’ operations.... The 2007 Budget Reform Act was enacted, in part, to prohibit the use of Legislative lump-sum appropriations. These new authorizations appear inconsistent with the spirit of such reforms."

at pp. 10-11 Transparency and Accountability

"High standards of transparency, accountability and oversight are critical to ensuring that taxpayer dollars are protected from waste and abuse, and public access to information is not diminished. When budgetary actions do not meet such standards, public resources are left vulnerable to misuse and inefficiency, and important discussion and debate may be shortcircuited. The SFY 2015-16 Enacted Budget omits several proposals from the Executive Budget that would have reduced government transparency and accountability. The Enacted Budget was timely, with final legislative action on appropriation bills missing the March 31 deadline by only hours. Still, transparency with respect to both process and content was sacrificed. The Joint Budget Conference subcommittee process, designed in part to provide public disclosure of budget negotiations, did not issue final reports of the results of subcommittee decisions. The initial meetings of the subcommittees indicated that $610 million was to be allocated by the substantive subcommittees for various programmatic areas. There were public meetings where various changes to the budget were discussed, but final conclusions were not reached. At that point, public meetings stopped and final reports were never delivered.

Several of the budget bills were printed before the conclusion of the budget negotiations, and lacked important provisions. For example, one of the largest areas of local spending, education and school aid, was removed from the Aid to Localities Budget Bill which the Legislature passed. The Aid to Localities Budget Bill was later amended in the final bills that were passed in each House within hours of being completed and made available to members of the Legislature and the public. The Capital Projects Budget Bill, which includes the allocation of billions of dollars in new spending from settlement funds, was also passed without the normal three-day aging period. Such bills were passed with messages of necessity.

As a result of the compressed schedule for Legislative action, bills addressing major areas of public interest, including changes to education and ethics requirements, were passed with only minimal information with respect to their content being disclosed. The rushed passage of these important bills denied the public the opportunity to get a full understanding of the agreements being reached and the impacts such agreements could have before their enactment.

The Enacted Budget includes various provisions that raise concerns regarding oversight, transparency and accountability. Several of these provisions were included in the Executive Budget proposal and in some cases modified in the Enacted Budget. ...

 
Comptroller DiNapoli's April 15, 2014 "Preliminary Report on the State Fiscal Year 2014-2015 Enacted Budget"

 

       Discovering the Hidden History of "Budget Reform"

S.8414/A.11995  - 2006

S07615 -- 2004 

Senate passes budget reform legislation -- Catharine Young (Jan. 2007)

 

Book:  Robert Ward:  The State Government's Biggest Job: The Budget

The Constitution sets no date for budget adoption; under the State Finance Law, the state’s fiscal year
begins on April 1.  (at p. 259)

The state’s fiscal year is set in statute (not the Constitution) as April 1 through March 31. (at p. 261)

The state Constitution does not specify when the budget must be adopted, but State Finance Law sets the fiscal year as April 1 through March 31.  (at p. 264)

 

click here for: 

RECORD --
CJA's Citizen-Taxpayer Action to End NYS' Corrupt Budget "Process"
& Unconstitutional "Three Men in a Room" Governance 

 

 

 

 

*    *    *

 

CJA's Budget-Related FOIL Requests -- 2016

CJA's Budget-Related FOIL Requests -- 2017

 

The Legislature's "Internal Control Responsibilities"
under Legislative Law Article VI

 

 

 
 

Top

 
CJA Site Search Engine Search CJA

CJA Homepage  •  Latest News  •  Join Us  •  Site Search

 

Post Office Box 8101, White Plains, New York 10602
Tel: (914) 421-1200
e-mail: mail@judgewatch.org