UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

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GEORGE SASSOWER,

Plaintiff,

-against-

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION; WEST PUBLISHING COMPANY; MEAD DATA CENTRAL, INC; LAWYERS COOPERATIVE PUBLISHING COMPANY; NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL COMPANY; DOW JONES AND COMPANY; KREINDLER & RELKIN, P.C.; CITIBANK, N.A.; FELTMAN, KARESH, MAJOR & FARBMAN; LEE FELTMAN; ANTHONY MASTROIANNI; ROBERT ABRAMS; HOWARD M. BERGSON; HYMAN RAFFE; A.R. FUELS, INC. JON O. NEWMAN; THOMAS J. MESKILL; JAMES L. OAKES; WILFRED FEINBERG; CHARLES L. BRIEANT; THOMAS P. GRIESA; STEVEN G. BREYER; WILLIAM J. YOUNG; WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST; JANET RENO; JUDITH S. KAYE; FRANCIS T. MURPHY; XAVIER C. RICCOBONO; and WILLIAM C. THOMPSON,

Defendants.

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Docket No. 93C

Trial by Jury Demanded

Plaintiff, as and for his complaint, respectfully sets forth and alleges:

1. Plaintiff brings this action directly under the Constitution and Laws of the United States, with jurisdiction in the U.S. District Court existing by virtue of 28 U.S.C. §1331, §1343, §1361, §2201 and 18 U.S.C. §1964.

2a. The AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ["ABA"]; WEST PUBLISHING COMPANY ["West/Westlaw"]; MEAD DATA CENTRAL, INC. ["Lexis"]; LAWYER'S COOPERATIVE PUBLISHING CO. ["LCPC"]; NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL COMPANY ["NYLJ Co"], and DOW JONES AND COMPANY ["WSJ"], are residents and/or do business in this judicial district within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §1391[c].

b(1) This is a personal capacity action against, inter alia, federal officials, who are intentionally acting contrary to legitimate federal interests to satisfy personal interests, and clearly not in the "scope" of their offices.

(2) This is not an action against the federal government, or any of its officers in their official capacities; no allegation is being made that any 28 U.S.C. §2675 notice of claim has been filed for the causes of action alleged herein; no judgment is sought by plaintiff against the United States, nor does plaintiff seek to impose any financial burden upon the United States for any defense representation.

(3) The misconduct of the federal defendants was performed jointly with state actors, acting under "color of law", consequently the federal defendants' misconduct also violated 42 U.S.C. §1983.

c. Similarly, this action is not against any state sovereign, directly and/or indirectly, and in view of the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, it could not be.

3a. Plaintiff, is a born American citizen, battle-starred veteran of World War II, a private person, who has not voluntarily thrust himself into matters of public controversy.

b. Plaintiff, by reason of the aforementioned, is entitled to all rights, privileges and immunities guaranteed by the Constitution and the Laws of the United States.

AS AND FOR A FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION.[1]

4a. For more than a decade, there have existed criminal racketeering enterprises in the concurring judicial

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[1] All prior allegations are thereby incorporated in subsequent causes of action by reference.

bailiwicks of New York and U.S. Second Circuit, in which members of the judiciary, state and federal, have actively participated.

b. Mandated by the criminal (e.g. 18 U.S.C. §4) and professional codes (Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 1-103) plaintiff was duty-bound to resist, report, and/or expose, such criminal activities, particularly where he had a fiduciary interest, which activities are fully documented and uncontroverted.

THE CORE MECHANICS OF JUDICIAL CORRUPTION

5a. The object of these criminal New York-Second Circuit racketeering enterprises, with its judicial involvement therein, is to ravish judicial trusts of their assets for personal benefit, and other personal motivated objects and activities.

b. Such larceny, and related criminal activities, are concealed by publications by the judiciary, not necessarily judicial, which: (1) contrive essential and decisive facts in, without jurisdiction, opinions; and (2) simultaneously and/or thereafter bar access to the courts for FRCivP, Rule 60(b), habeas corpus, and coram nobis, and other judicial relief, thus, inter alia, bootstrapping such void opinions into facial validity.

6a. In the two judicial estates in which plaintiff has a direct interest, the judiciary and its cronies converted all the assets to their personal benefit, leaving nothing for any creditors or beneficiary.

b. In the aforementioned two judicial estates jurists, such as, Chief U.S. Circuit Court Judge JON O. NEWMAN ["Newman"] of the SECOND CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS ["CCA2d"] and former Chief U.S. District Court Judge CHARLES L. BRIEANT ["Brieant"] of the SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ["SDNY"], usurping administrative powers, are engaged in the larceny of judicial trust assets, the diversion of monies payable "to the federal court" to private pockets, extortion, defrauding the federal purse, income tax evasion, and other egregious criminal activities.

c(1) None of the successive Attorney Generals of the United States, or any U.S. attorney has been willing to execute 28 U.S.C. §2679[d] "scope" certificates for these federal judges and/or their federal co-conspirators since no federal attorney will execute a "scope" certificate to those engaged in, inter alia, diverting monies payable "to the federal court" to private pockets.

(2) Nevertheless, they and their federal co-conspirators have been able to dragoon federal defense representation, at federal cost and expense, in personal capacity money damage tort actions against them.

7a(1) PUCCINI CLOTHES, LTD. ["Puccini"], was involuntarily dissolved more than 13 years ago, there is no accounting by the court-appointed receiver for its judicial trust assets, there is no final judgment or order by a jurist having the legal power, or subject matter jurisdiction, to render same, and discharge the receiver and his surety from further obligations, and there is no final judgment or order by anyone having personal jurisdiction over plaintiff or his constitutionally protected interests.

(2) Any and all judicial statements to the contrary are false, contrived and concocted, and made to conceal the judicial involvement in such larceny.

(3) The criminal entourage, in which Chief Judge Newman and former Chief Judge Brieant, are essential members, simply took all the assets for personal benefit.

b. Suffolk County New York Surrogate ERNEST L. SIGNORELLI ["Signorelli"] and his appointee, Public Administrator ANTHONY MASTROIANNI ["Mastroianni"] employed the assets of the ESTATE OF EUGENE PAUL KELLY ["Kelly Estate"] to satisfy personal obligations. The account was settled at the NY Appellate Division, with Justice Presiding WILLIAM C. THOMPSON ["Thompson"] without plaintiff being served, and at a time when the attorney for most of the beneficiaries was dead -- facts which Mr. Justice Thompson is aware, and being concealed for personal, albeit illegal, purposes.

c(1) Orders, without subject matter or personal jurisdiction, issued by the designees of Administrator XAVIER C. RICCOBONO ["Riccobono"], deny plaintiff access to the state courts to vacate the void and/or jurisdictionally infirm state orders, and mirrored orders have been issued by Chief Judge Newman and Chief Judge Brieant.

(2) Similar orders, which deny plaintiff access to the

courts, have been issued with respect to the Kelly Estate matter, by state and federal judges.

d. Thus, the larceny of these trusts has been accomplished, for personal benefit, in New York-Second Circuit.

8a. One example of the horrors faced by those who attempt to give obedience to their fiduciary and personal obligations follows:

b(1) Plaintiff has been repeatedly been convicted by the New York-Second Circuit courts of the constitutionally protected crimes of non-summary criminal contempt, each one without a trial, without the opportunity for a trial, without any confrontation rights, in absentia, without due process, without the right of allocution, without any live testimony in support thereof, and without any constitutional or legal waiver, with fines and/or terms of incarceration imposed thereon.

(2) As published by corrupt judges and courts, and republished by West, Westlaw, Lexis, LCPC, and NYLJ, these decisive infirmities are concealed.

c. Any attempt to obtain an original writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, requires the permission of Administrator Riccobono, or his designee in the state forums, or Chief Judge Brieant in the SDNY -- the recipients of bribe monies from plaintiff's adversaries.

d. If after serving the imposed terms of incarceration, resistance continues, these trialess convictions, are elevated, ex post facto, from "offenses" to "serious" crimes and the attorney, such as plaintiff, is disbarred.

9. Two, illustrative examples of the mechanics employed in the federal forums, are as follows:

a. In late 1987, there was instituted and pending before U.S. District Court Judge CHARLES S. HAIGHT ["Haight"], plaintiff's action (U.S.A. f/b/o Sassower v. Sapir, et al. [SDNY, 87-7135 CSH]), where relief was compelling and not barred by any injunction, when a suspect Order was issued by Judge Haight in that action.

b. Plaintiff was aware that U.S. District Court Judge WILLIAM C. CONNER ["Conner"] was "fixing" cases on behalf of KREINDLER & RELKIN, P.C. ["K&R"] and FELTMAN, KARESH, MAJOR & FARBMAN, Esqs. ["FKM&F"], the firms primarily responsible for the larceny of the judicial trust assets of Puccini, and other criminal activities, including bribing of judges and officials, state and federal.

c(1) Shortly after such suspect Order was issued, plaintiff unearthed a "fixing memorandum" from "Bill" Conner to "Sandy" Haight, which was delivered immediately preceding such suspect order.

(2) Plaintiff further learned that such "fixing memorandum" was, in turn, immediately preceded by an ex parte meeting between Judge Conner and FKM&F.

(3) This time, unlike prior occasions, plaintiff was able to expose this "Conner fix", without disclosing any of plaintiff's sources for obtaining confidential material, and did so by amending his complaint and adding Conner as a Dennis v. Sparks (449 U.S. 24 [1980]) "fixing" co-defendant.

d(1) Chief Judge Brieant, without any subject matter jurisdiction in this action or personal jurisdiction over plaintiff, without notice or any due process, on December 10, 1987, issued an edict, pursuant to some "phantom" administrative authority, which dismissed plaintiff's action and barred any further filings in that Court by plaintiff, except by judicial permission, always unavailable.

(2) In issuing such administrative edict, Chief Judge Brieant fabricated the fact that plaintiff had added Judge Haight as a party defendant, not Judge Conner, a fabrication necessary to justify his administrative intervention.

(3) This administrative edict is distributed, as if it was a judicial opinion, which it was not.

e(1) The conduct of Chief Judge Brieant, Judge Conner, FKM&F conduct clearly triggered <u>FRCivP</u>, 60[b] and money damage relief in favor of plaintiff.

(2) However, since as part of such dismissal edict, plaintiff is denied access to the SDNY, plaintiff cannot move or bring an action to vacate such dismissal, or bring an action for damages in the that Court.

f(1) In 1989, after plaintiff cooperated with the media on the subject of judicial corruption, without notice, without due process, without any case pending in the SDNY, and not in plaintiff's presence, Chief Judge Brieant issued his third edict which <u>physically</u> barred plaintiff from the Federal Courthouse in White Plains, even when plaintiff's constitutionally protected interests were being litigated.

(2) Plaintiff cannot obtain relief from such plainly unconstitutional order, because he cannot obtain permission to file an action in SDNY.

g. Thus, Judge Brieant and his patrons continuously commit tortious acts, but have effective immunity, as plaintiff is denied access to the SDNY and other courts for any relief.

* * *

10a. The 1990 conduct of Judge Newman was clearly criminal in nature, of a depraved magnitude, warranting a civil rights money award, and arguably common law money damages.

b. At no time, has anyone, including Judges Newman or Brieant, ever been able to articulate, with reasonably specificity, any judicial procedure ever undertaken by plaintiff that was "frivolous", or a reason that plaintiff would engage in such activities.

c. However, for self-protection, the protection of the Newman-Brieant criminal patrons, without a scintilla of evidence in support, Judge Newman concocted the assertion that plaintiff is a frivolous litigator, and barred him from making any filings in CCA2d, absent permission, always unavailable.

d. During the years that followed, the conduct of Judge Newman clearly triggered money damage liability in favor of plaintiff.

e. Confidential information, confirmed that such denial of permission was not rendered by the any panel of CCA2d or any judge thereof.

f. The CCA2d panel and/or judge was 'phantom', 'fictitious', and simply did not exist!

g. On September 10, 1993, plaintiff armed with evidence that the CCA2d panel and/or judge was "fictitious", wrote to Ms. Kathy Brouwer, Operational Manager of CCA2d, as follows:

> "I desire photocopies of the written directions of the involved panels which directed your office to issue denial orders in the following docket numbers: 93-3041 (8/4/93); 93-7172/7173 (8/4/93); 92-7907 (5/13/93); 92-7911 (5/13/93); 92-6194/6236 (5/13/93). If there is a charge for same, upon notification, I will forward same.
>
> If written directions do no exist, I desire to know the panels involved, who, when and to whom such directions were given." [emphasis in original]

h(1) Such letter inquiry was not a motion, did not present any "case or controversy", and did not give the CCA2d any subject matter jurisdiction to render a published "opinion" on the matter.

(2) Nor, by mailing such letter inquiry, did plaintiff vest CCA2d with any personal jurisdiction over him.

(3) Chief Judge Newman, recognizing that plaintiff was aware of the extant fraud, sua sponte, transmogrified the aforementioned letter into a motion, and rendered a published defamatory diatribe, where he and other disqualified jurists, ex post facto, fictionalized the existence of an "unidentified" jurist, as the jurist who was adjudicating plaintiff's applications for permission to file (Matter of Sassower, F.2d [2d Cir.-11/5/93], per Newman, Ch.J]), when in fact such jurist did not exist.

i(1) At the time there were money damage actions by plaintiff against Chief Judge Newman, and an application for a grand jury inquiry into his criminal activities, all of which were not mentioned in such published opinion.

(2) Chief Judge Newman was unquestionably disqualified to adjudicate plaintiff's matters, as he is, inter alia, financially affected by the outcome, in a very substantial manner.

j. Nevertheless, by such recent decision, which was not judicial, as well as Judge Newman's 1990 "sham" edict, plaintiff cannot gain access to CCA2d, in order to litigate his "cases or controversies" that he desires to be presented for adjudication, the mandate in Article III of the U.S. Constitution to the contrary notwithstanding.

11. The operative facts of these criminal racketeering activities, as demonstrated by the litigation revolving around Puccini -- "the judicial fortune cookie" -- are as follows:

a. Puccini was involuntarily dissolved by the SUPREME COURT, NEW YORK COUNTY ["SCNY"] on June 4, 1980. Albeit dissolved and helpless, Puccini was a "person" within the meaning of Amendment V and XIV of the U.S. Constitution, whose assets and affairs vested in the court, under color of law, within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §1983.

b. All of Puccini's judicial trust assets were made the subject of larceny, engineered by K&R and CITIBANK, N.A. ["Citibank"], leaving nothing for any of its nationwide legitimate creditors, including plaintiff.

(1) In total, more than $4,000,000 was debited against Puccini's checking account following the decree of dissolution, none of which was authorized by any court or court-appointed receiver.

Sixteen (16) checks from the Puccini account were made payable directly to the K&R clients, but most of the check payments, were bribe monies to third parties.

(2) During a seven (7) month period following judicial dissolution of Puccini, approximately twelve (12) employees sold and transferred Puccini's <u>entire</u> huge inventory, but <u>only</u> $512 <u>gross</u> was credited to its account. The shipping expenses alone, was many times this $512 gross income. Here again, Puccini's inventory and/or the proceeds of same, were employed to bribe and corrupt.

c. Anything which could be converted for private use and benefit was so converted by the K&R-Citibank criminal entourage, with certain transactions proving to be of special significance.

(1) K&R and Citibank were indebted to RASHBA & POKART ["R&P] in the sum of $6,200. To satisfy such personal obligation, $10,000 was transferred from Puccini's account to ARUTT, NACHAMIE, BENJAMIN, LIPKIN & KIRSCHNER, P.C. ["ANBL&K"], with a false "legal fees" notation. This $10,000 was "laundered" through the account of ANBL&K, who then paid R&P $6,200 in satisfaction of the K&R-Citibank indebtedness, and kept $3,800 for itself, as a "laundering fee".

(2) Since the maximum fee that may be awarded a court-appointed receiver, such as Feltman, is statutory (NY Bus. Corp. Law §1217), in order to circumvent such monetary limitation, K&R and Citibank agreed to transfer to FKM&F, Feltman's law firm, from Puccini's assets, about ten (10) times such maximum fee, provided the larceny was concealed and no attempt was made at recovery.

However, by law, nothing could be given FKM&F for legal fees or disbursements, since: (1) there was a mandatory prohibition against, inter alia, attorneys receiving any monies from a judicial trust where they had not been judicially appointed (22 NYCRR §660.24[f]); and (2) FKM&F did nothing to benefit Puccini or which was intended to benefit it.[*]

d. For forty-two (42) months K&R, Citibank and their co-conspirators inundated the forums, judicial and extrajudicial, with perjurious affidavits and false statements, vehemently denying any unlawful dissipation of Puccini's assets.

(1) For example, as part of a K&R motion for summary judgment, CHARLES ZANGARA ["Zangara"], a Vice-President of Citibank, submitted an affidavit which stated:

> "... Raffe claims that ... 'assets [of Puccini] have been dissipated for the benefit of plaintiffs [K&R clients]. Once again, no documentary evidence is offered in support of this groundless assertion. ...

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[*] Obviously, the mandatory NY Judiciary Law §35-a Statements were not filed, since such Statements require:

> "The judge or justice shall certify that the fee, commission, allowance or other compensation fixed or approved is a reasonable award for the services rendered by the appointee ...".

> The unsupported and baseless charge that the Estate has dissipated the assets of Puccini Clothes, Ltd. is totally false. The Estate has received no monies whatsoever from Puccini Clothes, Ltd."

(2) JEROME H. BARR, Esq. ["Barr"], a K&R associate and client, submitted an affidavit, dated July 21, 1981 -- while such larcenous transactions were in progress -- which included the following statement:

> "Unfortunately, it is necessary to correct some of the incredible misstatements and outright falsehoods contained in the Raffe affidavits.
>
> The Estate of Kaufman has received no monies from Puccini Clothes, Ltd. ... [He and Citibank] do not have any access to it['s assets], nor have they received any monies from Puccini."

(3) In light of these unambiguous sworn statements, without granting pre-trial disclosure which had been stayed, the jurist granted summary judgment in favor of the K&R clients.

e. On November 7, 1983, the initial "hard evidence" of K&R-Citibank engineered larceny surfaced, and in the months that followed, it reached avalanche proportions.

12a. In every American jurisdiction, a court-appointed fiduciary, an arm of the court, <u>must</u> account for his stewardship, before he or his surety can be discharged. It is an obligation that cannot be waived, excused or enjoined by any person, official, judge or court (II <u>Tandy's Smith</u> on Receivers [2d Ed.-1920], §607, p. 1705-1707; <u>High on Receivers</u> [4th Ed.-1910], §797, p. 941-942).

b(1) In New York, a court-appointed receiver <u>must</u> file an accounting "at least once a year" (22 <u>NYCRR</u> §202.52[e]).

(2) Notwithstanding such mandatory obligation, which cannot be waived, excused or enjoined, in the more than thirteen (13) years since Puccini was involuntarily dissolved, not a single accounting has been filed -- not one!

c(1) In New York, when a decree of involuntary dissolution is entered for a corporation and a receiver is appointed, the NY State Attorney General becomes the statutory fiduciary,

(2) In addition to extensive discretionary powers granted to the Attorney General for the benefit of the judicial trust, and

> "the shareholders, creditors or other persons interested in the assets of any corporation for which a receiver has been appointed" (NY Bus Corp. Law §1214[a]),

there are mandatory, non-discretionary, "duties" imposed upon the Attorney General, including the obligation to make application to the court to compel the receiver to account, if not voluntarily rendered within eighteen (18) months (NY Bus. Corp. Law §1216[a]).

(3) Notwithstanding such mandatory obligation, in the more than one hundred and sixty-two (162) months that have elapsed, since Puccini was involuntarily dissolved, not a single application has been made by NY State Attorney General ROBERT ABRAMS ["Abrams"], the statutory fiduciary, to compel Puccini's receiver to account -- not one!

(4) Indeed, when such application is made by plaintiff, who holds extensive contractually based claims against Puccini, to compel such accounting, as is specifically authorized

by statute (NY Bus. Corp. Law §1216[a]), it is opposed or not supported by Attorney General Abrams.

d(1) Research has revealed that since 1979, during the concurrent tenure in office of NY State Appellate Division, Presiding Justice FRANCIS T. MURPHY ["Murphy"] of the First Department, and Attorney General Abrams, in not a single instance has Attorney General Abrams exercised his fiduciary obligations, including those which are mandatory in nature, in the Presiding Justice Murphy judicial bailiwick, unless consented to by Presiding Justice Murphy.

(2) Presiding Justice Murphy operates a "patronage mill" from his Courthouse, which he regards as his "personal fiefdom" (NY Newsday, November 25, 1988 and December 1, 1988), and one of his operational managers is the son of [former] Chief Judge Brieant, while Presiding Justice Murphy's son was employed by Chief Judge Brieant, a practice labelled as "disguised nepotism", and condemned more vehemently than simple "nepotism".[*]

(3) Thus, with the cooperation of Attorney General Abrams, the statutory fiduciary, the Murphy entourage can and do rape and ravish the judicial trusts estates, at will and with impunity.

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[*] In Spector v. State Commission on Judicial Conduct, 47 N.Y.2d 462, 466, 418 N.Y.S.2d 565, 566, 392 N.E.2d 552, 553 [1979]), in condemning such cross-appointments, the Court stated:

> "First, nepotism is to be condemned, and disguised nepotism imports an additional component of evil because, implicitly conceding that evident nepotism would be unacceptable, the actor seeks to conceal what he is really accomplishing."

e(1) Since neither Feltman nor his surety, F&D, could be discharged without a filed accounting, impossible under the Puccini circumstances, without further exposure, K&R and FKM&F "paid-off" and otherwise corrupted, Administrator XAVIER C. RICCOBONO ["Riccobono"], a Murphy subordinate, to manage a cover-up.

(2) Puccini was a ward of the Riccobono court, and it was to be Riccobono, who was now to be in charge of concealing such larceny, and not making any recovery on behalf of his court's judicial trust!

f(1) Riccobono was not "the court" in the Puccini matter, nor did he have any right to employ administrative powers, to interfere in Puccini judicial proceedings, which were on-going before honest jurists in that Court at the time.

(2) Nevertheless, in order to implement this corrupt agreement, Riccobono issued an ex parte administrative order which designated Referee DONALD DIAMOND ["Diamond"], an at-will employee, who had very little judicial power (NY CPLR §4317[b]), and who conducted proceedings in a non-public courtroom, in manifest violation of statute (NY Judiciary Law §4).

(3) Within a few months after his designation, without any due process, for exposing the transpiring corrupt activities, Referee Diamond permanently and physically excluded plaintiff from his non-public courtroom facility, despite plaintiff's constitutionally protected interests involved in such litigation.

Shortly thereafter, plaintiff's eldest daughter was similarly physically excluded because she was informing plaintiff as to the events occurring therein.

g(1) Notwithstanding, plaintiff's physical exclusion from such Diamond Courtroom, and his lack of participation as a result thereof, there flowed from Referee Diamond a constant flow of derogatory opinions concerning plaintiff, causing constitutional injuries, many of which were published in the NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL ["NYLJ"].

(2) None of these NYLJ published decisions revealed that plaintiff was physically excluded from Referee Diamond's courtroom, that the proceedings were void by reason thereof, and that Referee Diamond had no subject matter or personal jurisdiction on the matters set forth in such published diatribes.

h(1) On various days in September of 1986, there was published in the NYLJ, as well as in the NEW YORK TIMES ["NY Times"], legal notices concerning the "approval" of an accounting for Puccini.

(2) As the "legal notice" appeared in the NY Times on September 22, 1986, as inserted by Feltman at Puccini's expense, the legend was "NOTICE OF INTENT BY RECEIVER TO FILE ACCOUNTS FOR FINAL SETTLEMENT" for Puccini, and that such event would take place on October 30, 1986 at 10:00 a.m. before Referee Diamond, at which time Feltman would be discharged and his bond vacated.

(3) There was <u>no</u> "accounting" presented by Feltman or anyone else, then or thereafter, such "accounting" was and is

'phantom', albeit approval was consented to by NY State Attorney General Abrams, the statutory fiduciary for Puccini.

(4) Plaintiff, was never served with notice of such event, as required by law, nor permitted in the Referee Diamond courtroom, even had he been served.

i. Such published "legal notices" was a judicial fraud, civil and criminal, upon, inter alia, all the nationwide creditors of Puccini and the public.

13a. Plaintiff eventually found means to circumvent the jurisdiction of Referee Diamond, and his edicts, and also jurists in SCNY began to disregard these Diamond edicts, as being jurisdictionally wanting.

b. Consequently, by "computer manipulation", Administrator Riccobono caused the assignment of SCNY Justice IRA GAMMERMAN ["Gammerman"] who issued his Order of March 11, 1986, which adjudicated plaintiff to be in non-summary criminal contempt.

c(1) There was no notice of motion, nor order to show cause, no supporting papers, no accusation, no opposing papers, no trial, no confrontation rights, nor anything else, albeit they were recited in such Contempt Order.

(2) All papers recited in the Contempt Order were 'phantom'.

d(1) The Order finding plaintiff in contempt, in this 'phantom' proceeding, ordered that all actions, in all state courts, in all counties in the State of New York, be transferred to Mr. Justice Gammerman, the author of this bogus order.

(2) Included in such transfer were actions wherein Mr. Justice Gammerman was a party defendant or respondent, or an essential witness.

(3) After these actions and proceedings were dragooned to Mr. Justice Gammerman, including those which sought to liquidate plaintiff's contractually based money claims, specifically protected by Article I, §10[1] of the U.S. Constitution against "impairment", Gammerman stayed such claims.

(4) Thus, since 1986, all plaintiff's actions have been stayed.

e. Under another Justice Gammerman, without jurisdiction, without due process order, plaintiff can only institute an action or motion with Gammerman's permission or the permission of Administrator Riccobono -- always unavailable.

14a. In every action in the state or federal court, Puccini's statutory fiduciary, NY Attorney General Abrams, appears for those state jurists and officials, at state cost and expense, albeit sued in their personal capacities and although they have raped the assets of Puccini for personal benefit.

b. In the federal courts, these appearances for corrupt state judges and officials, are at state cost and expense, by Attorney General Abrams triggers an XI Amendment subject matter jurisdictional infirmity.

c. In the Second Circuit such XI Amendment jurisdictional bar is ignored, but in the First, Third, Fourth, Sixth and District of Columbia circuits the intervention of Chief Judge Newman, former Chief Judges THOMAS J. MESKILL ["Meskill"];

JAMES L. OAKES ["Oakes"]; WILFRED FEINBERG ["Feinberg"] and/or Brieant "the quintet of federal judicial fixers" is necessary.

15a. Federal judges and officials from the Second Circuit or elsewhere, involved in this judicial racket, unable to obtain 28 U.S.C. §2679[d] "scope" certifications are nevertheless represented in money damage tort litigation by federal attorneys, at federal cost and expense, in the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Eight, Ninth, and District of Columbia circuits, as well as the Supreme Court of the United States, with the knowledge and consent of, inter alia, Attorney General JANET RENO ["Reno"], Solicitor General DREW S. DAYS, III ["Days"], Chief Justice WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST ["Rehnquist"].

b(1) As with the misconduct of Attorney General Abrams, in every significant instance, these federal representatives, as well as the members of the judiciary, comport themselves contrary to legitimate federal interests.

(2) Thus, for example, if plaintiff moves to recover on behalf of the federal government, monies that were payable "to the federal court" but diverted to the K&R clients, it is not supported, or at times opposed, by the U.S. attorney involved.

c. The contours of defendants obligations and plaintiff's rights implicated thereby, are sufficiently clear that reasonable officials would understand that what they are doing violates plaintiff's rights.

16a. All the opinions, orders and judgments, actual and/or fictitious, are not entitled to any legal respect by any court until, plaintiff is afforded an full and fair opportunity to litigate their validity, in addition to be actionable in money damages.

b. The publishers, legal and/or otherwise, such as WSJ, are liable in damages for republishing material causing constitutional injuries and where subject matter jurisdiction did not exist, in addition to other relief.

AS AND FOR A SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

17a. Plaintiff has substantial contractually based, constitutionally protected assets against, inter alia, Puccini, A.R. FUELS, INC. ["AR"] and Raffe, including a money judgment and liquidated claims, some of which are unrelated to Puccini.

b. However because he is denied access to the courts, he has been relegated to government "food stamp" relief.

18a. Plaintiff, under the without due process edict of Brieant, was denied permission to bring an action to liquidate his contractually based judgment and other claims against Puccini; his contractually based claims against AR and Raffe; and to compel Feltman to account for Puccini's judicial trust assets, a constitutional and statutory right (NY Bus. Corp. Law §1216[a]) by SDNY.

b. Permission to appeal such denials by SDNY was denied by CCA2d, on May 13, 1993, as demonstrated by plaintiff's letter of September 10, 1993, by a 'phantom' judge, which was, ex post facto, fabricated by Newman to conceal the fact that there was no panel of judges that issued such orders.

c. The right to access to the courts where a federal question exists, is absolute under Article III and not subject to judicial favor.

19. Furthermore, the commerce and privileges and immunities clauses prohibit each district or each circuit from determining for themselves which cases they will not adjudicate, or refuse to adjudicate those cases brought by a "whistle blower", whose obligations exists in the criminal and professional codes.

AS AND FOR A THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

20. Plaintiff also has not been permitted to file his District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman (460 U.S. 462 [1982]) complaints.

21. In the Second Judicial Department in New York, where plaintiff was disbarred and where they are harassing another attorney who it perceives to be associated with plaintiff and can exercise some leverage with him, the following situation exists.

a. The Attorney for the Grievance Committee, as published, is not the Attorney for the Grievance Committee, but an at-will employee of the Second Department, who obeys the desires of the Second Department not the Grievance Committee.

b. This at-will employee of the Second Department prosecutes and the initial determination is made by a compensated Referee selected by the Second Department. If his findings are not in accord with the desires of the Second Department, he is not given subsequent appointments.

c. The prosecution is commenced by a confidential memorandum filed by the so-called Attorney for the Grievance Committee, seen by the Second Department, but never the accused.

d. None of the basic constitutional rights are afforded the accused. Thus, the courts, by confidential memorandum, might state that certain conduct is not the subject of disciplinary sanctions, this fact is not disclosed to the accused by the Attorney for the Grievance Committee.

e. An attorney can rob, steal, plunder, and commit about every unethical act provided in the Professional Code. If he is a court favorite, or "pays-off" favorite judges, it is the attorney who makes complaint (cf. DR 1-103) who is sanctioned, not the K&Rs or FKM&Fs.

f. Given the vague language of the Code of Professional Responsibility, any attorney is subject to a disciplinary prosecution.

g. In practice, few of any federal constitutional rights are recognized in disciplinary proceedings in the State of New York, and elsewhere, in which plaintiff has substantial familiarity.

h. In view of the confidential nature of some of plaintiff's evidence on the subject (NY Judiciary Law §90[10]), this will be supplemented by private memorandum, on notice to ABA.

22. The Code of Professional Responsibility and practices wherein sanctions are sought, should be declared unconstitutional.

24a. Eventually, plaintiff filed a new complaint (Sassower v. West, Docket No. 93-), which, in substantial part, was a Dennis v. Sparks (449 U.S. 24 [1980]) complaint, and included Newman, Breyer, K&R and Citibank, as "fixing" culprits, which was denying plaintiff due process.

b. For ministerial misconduct, Judge Young was also made a party defendant.

c. These papers have also been "hijacked", or at least have not, and will not, be processed, pursuant to still another "fix", by Newman, Breyer, and K&R.

25. Under such Newman "fix" the First Circuit has accepted the representation of an Assistant N.Y. Attorney General for thirteen (13) rogue state jurists and officials, including Attorney General Abrams, at state cost and expense, all of whom are being sued in a personal capacity, for conduct contrary to state interests, and notwithstanding Amendment XI, with the approval, express or by sufferance, of, inter alia, Chief Administrator of the Administrative Board of the Courts of the State of New York, JUDITH S. KAYE ["Kaye"].

WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands judgment, racketeering and otherwise, punitive and otherwise, for the sum of $1,000,000,000, together with costs and disbursement of this action.

Dated: December 6, 1993

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