SUPREME COURT OF STATE OF NEW YORK ALBANY COUNTY

Soptember 2, 2016
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CENTER FOR JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY, INC. and ELENA RUTH SASSOWER, individually and as Director of the Center for Judicial Accountability, Inc., acting on their own behalf and on behalf of the People of the State of New York & the Public Interest.

VERIFIED COMPLAINT

Index #5122-16

Plaintiffs.

-against-

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

ANDREW M. CUOMO, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of New York, JOHN J. FLANAGAN in his official capacity as Temporary Senate President, THE NEW YORK STATE SENATE, CARL E. HEASTIE, in his official capacity as Assembly Speaker, THE NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY, ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of New York, THOMAS P. DiNAPOLI, in his official capacity as Comptroller of the State of New York, and JANET M. DiFIORE, in her official capacity as Chief Judge of the State of New York and chief judicial officer of the Unified Court System,

Defendants.	
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"It is the purpose of the legislature to recognize that each individual citizen and taxpayer of the state has an interest in the proper disposition of all state funds and properties. Whenever this interest is or may be threatened by an illegal or unconstitutional act of a state officer or employee, the need for relief is so urgent that any citizen-taxpayer should have and hereafter does have a right to seek the remedies provided for herein."

State Finance Law Article 7-A, §123: "Legislative purpose"

Plaintiffs, as and for their verified complaint, respectfully set forth and allege:

1. By this citizen-taxpayer action pursuant to State Finance Law Article 7-A [§123 et seq.], plaintiffs seek declaratory judgments as to the unconstitutionality and unlawfulness of the Governor's Legislative/Judiciary Budget Bill #S.6401/A.9001, both the original bill and the enacted amended bill #S.6401-a/A.9001-a. The expenditures of the enacted budget bill - embodying the

Legislature's proposed budget for fiscal year 2016-2017, the Judiciary's proposed budget for fiscal year 2016-2017, and tens of millions of dollars in uncertified and nonconforming legislative and judicial reappropriations – are unconstitutional, unlawful, and fraudulent disbursements of state funds and taxpayer monies, which plaintiffs hereby seek to enjoin.

- 2. Plaintiffs also seek declarations voiding the judicial salary increases recommended by the December 24, 2015 report of the Commission on Legislative, Judicial and Executive Compensation because they are statutorily-violative, fraudulent, and unconstitutional, with further declarations striking the budget statute establishing the Commission Chapter 60, Part E, of the Laws of 2015 as unconstitutional and itself fraudulent and injunctions to prevent further disbursement of state money pursuant thereto.
- Additionally, plaintiffs seek declarations that the "process" by which the State budget for fiscal year 2016-2017 was enacted is unconstitutional, specifically including:
 - the failure of Senate and Assembly committees and the full chambers of each house to amend and pass the Governor's appropriation bills and to reconcile them so that they might "become law immediately without further action by the governor", as mandated by Article VII, §4 of the New York State Constitution;
 - the so-called "one-house budget proposals", emerging from closed-door political conferences of the Senate and Assembly majority party/coalitions;
 - the proceedings of the Senate and Assembly joint budget conference committee and its subcommittees, conducted by staff, behind-closed-doors, based on the "one-house budget proposals"; and
 - the behind-closed-doors, three-men-in-a-room budget deal-making by the Governor, Temporary Senate President, and Assembly Speaker.
- 4. Finally, plaintiffs seek declarations as to the unconstitutionality and unlawfulness of the appropriation item entitled "For grants to counties for district attorney salaries" in the Division of Criminal Justice Services' budget for fiscal year 2016-2017, contained in Aid to Localities Budget

Bill #S.6403-d/A.9003-d and of items of reappropriation therein pertaining to previous "grants to counties for district attorney salaries" and "recruitment and retention" incentives – and enjoining disbursement of state monies pursuant thereto.

5. For the convenience of the Court, a Table of Contents follows:

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	AS AND FOR A SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION



AS AND FOR A SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

The Judiciary's Proposed Budget for 2016-2017, Embodied in the Governor's Budget Bill #S.6401/A.9001, is Unconstitutional & Unlawful

- 34. Plaintiffs repeat, reiterate, and reallege ¶¶ 1-33 herein with the same force and effect as if more fully set forth.
- 35. Plaintiffs' second cause of action herein is the tenth cause of action of their March 23, 2016 verified second supplemental complaint in their prior citizen-taxpayer action (Exhibit A: ¶317-331). Such is not barred by Justice McDonough's August 1, 2016 decision (Exhibit D)—nor could it be as the August 1, 2016 decision is a judicial fraud, falsifying the record in all material respects to conceal plaintiffs' entitlement to summary judgment on causes of action 1-4 of their verified complaint and causes of action 5-8 of their verified supplemental complaint and, based thereon, to the granting of their motion for leave to file their verified second supplemental complaint with its causes of action 9-16.
- 36. Establishing that the August 1, 2016 decision is a judicial fraud -- and that Justice McDonough was duty-bound to have disqualified himself for pervasive actual bias born of his financial interest in the litigation is plaintiffs' analysis of the decision, annexed hereto (Exhibit G).
- 37. As highlighted by the analysis (Exhibit G: pp. 24-28), plaintiffs' second and sixth causes of action (Exhibit B: ¶99-108; Exhibit C: ¶179-193) which correspond to their tenth cause of action (Exhibit A: ¶317-331) were each dismissed by Justice McDonough in the same fraudulent way: by completely disregarding the fundamental standards for dismissal motions, distorting the few allegations he cherry-picked, baldly citing inapplicable law, and resting on "documentary evidence" that he did not identify and which does not exist.
 - Plaintiffs analysis is accurate, true, and correct in all material respects.

39. In addition to the facts set forth by the tenth cause of action of plaintiffs' March 23, 2016 verified second supplemental complaint (Exhibit A: ¶317-331) is the further fact, anticipated by its ¶331, namely, that the Judiciary is funding the 2016 phase of the judicial salary increase recommended by the December 24, 2015 report of the Commission on Legislative, Judicial and Executive Compensation from its §3 reappropriations, *via* its §2 interchange provision. Such reinforces the unconstitutionality of the interchange provision and the reappropriations, detailed at ¶320-331– key features of the Judiciary's slush-fund budget.

AS AND FOR AN THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

The Governor's Budget Bill #S.6401/A.9001 is Unconstitutional & Unlawful
Over & Beyond the Legislative & Judiciary Budgets it Embodies
"Without Revision"

- 40. Plaintiffs repeat, reiterate, and reallege ¶¶ 1-39 herein with the same force and effect as if more fully set forth.
- 41. Plaintiffs' third cause of action herein is the eleventh cause of action of their March 23, 2016 verified second supplemental complaint in their prior citizen-taxpayer action (Exhibit A: ¶332-335). Such is not barred by Justice McDonough's August 1, 2016 decision nor could it be as the August 1, 2016 decision is a judicial fraud, falsifying the record in all material respects to conceal plaintiffs' entitlement to summary judgment on causes of action 1-4 of their verified complaint and causes of action 5-8 of their verified supplemental complaint and, based thereon, to the granting of their motion for leave to file their verified second supplemental complaint with its causes of action 9-16.
- 42. Establishing that the August 1, 2016 decision is a judicial fraud—and that Justice McDonough was duty-bound to have disqualified himself for pervasive actual bias born of his financial interest in the litigation—is plaintiffs' analysis of the decision, annexed hereto (Exhibit 6).

Exhibit A to Plaintiffs' September 2, 2016 Verified Complaint [R.135-225]

SUPREME COURT OF STATE OF NEW YORK ALBANY COUNTY

CENTER FOR JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY, INC. and ELENA RUTH SASSOWER, individually and as Director of the Center for Judicial Accountability, Inc., acting on their own behalf and on behalf of the People of the State of New York & the Public Interest,

VERIFIED SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs,

-against-

Index #1788-2014

ANDREW M. CUOMO, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of New York, DEAN SKELOS in his official capacity as Temporary Senate President, THE NEW YORK STATE SENATE, SHELDON SILVER, in his official capacity as Assembly Speaker, THE NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY, ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of New York, and THOMAS DiNAPOLI, in his official capacity as Comptroller of the State of New York,

Defendants.

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

"...one need only examine the Constitutional, statutory, and Senate and Assembly rule provisions relating to openness – such as Article III, §10 of New York's Constitution '... The doors of each house shall be kept open...'; Public Officers Law, Article VI 'The legislature therefore declares that government is the public's business...'; Senate Rule XI, §1 'The doors of the Senate shall be kept open'; Assembly Rule II, §1 'A daily stenographic record of the proceedings of the House shall be made and copies thereof shall be available to the public' – to see that government by behind-closed-doors deal-making, such as employed by defendants CUOMO, [FLANAGAN], [HEASTIE], SENATE, and ASSEMBLY, is an utter anathema and unconstitutional – and that a citizen-taxpayer action could successfully be brought against the whole of the Executive budget."

culminating final paragraph of plaintiffs' verified complaint (¶126)
 & verified supplemental complaint (¶236)

SOA

R-135

Plaintiffs, as and for their verified second supplemental complaint, respectfully set forth and allege:

- 237. By this citizen-taxpayer action pursuant to State Finance Law Article 7-A [§123 et seq.], plaintiffs additionally seek declaratory judgment as to the unconstitutionality and unlawfulness of the Governor's Legislative/Judiciary Budget Bill #S.6401/A.9001. The expenditures of such budget bill—embodying the Legislature's proposed budget for fiscal year 2016-2017, the Judiciary's proposed budget for fiscal year 2016-2017, and millions of dollars in uncertified and nonconforming legislative and judicial reappropriations—are unconstitutional, unlawful, and fraudulent disbursements of state funds and taxpayer monies, which plaintiffs hereby seek to enjoin.
- 238. Plaintiffs also seek, pursuant to State Finance Law Article 7-A, a declaration voiding the "force of law" judicial salary increases recommended by the December 24, 2015 Report of the Commission on Legislative, Judicial and Executive Compensation because they are statutorily-violative, fraudulent, and unconstitutional, with a further declaration striking the budget statute establishing the Commission Chapter 60, Part E, of the Laws of 2015 as unconstitutional and itself fraudulent.
- 239. Additionally, plaintiffs seek declarations that the so-called "one-house budget proposals", emerging from the closed-door political conferences of the Senate and Assembly majority party/coalitions, are unconstitutional, as are the proceedings based thereon of the Senate and Assembly joint budget conference committee and its subcommittees; and that the behind-closed-doors, three-men-in-a-room budget dealing-making by the Governor, Temporary Senate President, and Assembly Speaker such as produced Chapter 60, Part E, of the Laws of 2015 is unconstitutional and enjoining same with respect to Judiciary/Legislative Budget Bill #S.6401/A.9001 and the whole of the Executive Budget.

- 240. Plaintiffs repeat, reallege, and reiterate the entirety of their March 28, 2014 verified complaint pertaining to the Legislature's and Judiciary's proposed budgets and the Governor's Legislative/Judiciary Budget Bill #S.6351/A.8551 for fiscal year 2014-2015 and the entirety of their March 31, 2015 verified supplemental complaint pertaining to the Legislature's and Judiciary's proposed budgets and the Governor's Legislative/Judiciary Budget Bill #S.2001/A.3001 for fiscal year 2015-2016, incorporating both by reference, as likewise the record based thereon.
- 241. Virtually all the constitutional, statutory, and rule violations therein detailed are replicated in the Legislature's and Judiciary's proposed budgets for fiscal year 2016-2017 and the Governor's Legislative/Judiciary Budget Bill #S.6401/A.9001 including as to the judicial salary increases that will automatically take effect April 1, 2016. As stated at ¶129 of the verified supplemental complaint and even truer now "It is, as the expression goes, "déjà vu all over again".

242. For the convenience of the Court, a Table of Contents follows:

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The Legislature's Proposed Budget for Fiscal Year 2016-2017,
Embodied in Budget Bill #S.6401/A.9001, is Unconstitutional & Unlawful

2008 reports on the Legislature. Rather, it is because – without warrant of the Constitution, statute, or Senate and Assembly rules, as here demonstrated, the Temporary Senate President and Speaker have seized control of the Legislature's own budget, throwing asunder the constitutional command: 'itemized estimate of the financial needs of the legislature, certified by the presiding officer of each house'".

316. Once again, defendant CUOMO has abetted this constitutional defiance – including by not even furnishing a recommendation on the Legislature's budget that he sends back to it "without revision".



AS AND FOR A TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

The Judiciary's Proposed Budget for 2016-2017, Embodied in Budget Bill #S.6401/A.9001, is Unconstitutional & Unlawful

- 317. Plaintiffs repeat, reiterate, and reallege ¶1-316 with the same force and effect as if more fully set forth herein and, specifically, their "Questions for Chief Administrative Judge Marks", transmitted by their February 2, 2016 e-mail (Exhibit 44).
- 318. The Judiciary's proposed budget for fiscal year 2016-2017, embodied by Budget Bill #S.6401/A.9001, is materially <u>identical</u> to the Judiciary's proposed budget for fiscal years 2014-2015 and 2015-2016, embodied by the Governor's Legislative/Judiciary budget bills for those years. As such, it suffers from the <u>same</u> unconstitutionality, unlawfulness, and fraudulence as set forth by the second cause of action of plaintiffs' verified complaint (¶¶99-108), reiterated and reinforced by the sixth cause of action of plaintiffs' supplemental verified complaint (¶¶179-193).
- 319. <u>Identical</u> to the Judiciary's proposed budget for the past two fiscal years, defendant CUOMO, his Division of the Budget, and defendants SENATE and ASSEMBLY are unable to comprehend the Judiciary's proposed budget for fiscal year 2016-2017 on its most basic level: its cumulative dollar amount and its percentage increase over the Judiciary's budget for the current

fiscal year. As stated at the outset of plaintiffs' "Questions for Chief Administrative Judge Marks" (Exhibit 44), they diverge as to relevant figures and percentages:

A. <u>Defendant CUOMO's "Commentary of the Governor on the Judiciary" (Exhibit 79-a):</u>

"The Judiciary has requested appropriations of \$2.13 billion for court operations, exclusive of the cost of employee benefits. As submitted, disbursements for court operations from the General Fund are projected to grow by \$44.4 million or 2.4 percent."

B. <u>Defendant CUOMO's Division of the Budget website, which defers to text furnished by</u> <u>Judiciary (Exhibit 29-a):</u>

"The Judiciary's General Fund Operating Budget requests \$1.9 billion, excluding fringe benefits, for Fiscal Year 2016-2017. This represents a cash increase of \$44.4 million, or 2.4%. The appropriation request is \$1.9 billion, which represents a \$43.4 million, or 2.3%, increase.

The Judiciary's All Funds budget request for Fiscal Year 2016-2017, excluding fringe benefits, totals \$2.13 billion, an appropriation increase of \$48.3 million or 2.3% over the 2014-2015 All Funds budget..."

C. <u>Senate Majority's "White Book", under Senate Finance Committee Chair Young's auspices</u> (Exhibit 29-b):

"The FY 2017 Executive Budget proposes All Funds spending of \$2.9 billion, an increase of \$112.2 million, or 4.1 percent." (p. 91). This is further particularized by a chart representing this as "Proposed Disbursements – All Funds": \$2,865,600,000 – representing a change of \$112,224.000 and a percentage of 4.08% (p. 93).

"the Judiciary's proposed budget would increase general fund cash spending by \$44.4 million, or 2.4 percent".

D. <u>Senate Minority's "Blue Book"</u>, under Senate Finance Committee Ranking Member Krueger's auspices (Exhibit 29-c):

"The Judiciary proposed Budget is \$2.13 billion, an increase of \$48.2 million or 2.3% from the SFY 2015-2016 Enacted Budget..." (p. 179).

This is further particularized by a chart as the "Executive Recommendation 2016-17": \$2,132,526,345, the "\$ change" as \$48,254,307, and the "% Change" as 2.3% (p. 179).

E. <u>Assembly Majority's "Yellow Book", under Assembly Ways and Means Committee Chair Farrell's auspices (Exhibit 29-d):</u>

"The Judiciary's proposed budget request recommends appropriations of \$2.9 billion, which is an increase of \$81.94 million or 2.9 percent from the State Fiscal Year (SFY) 2015-16 level." (p. 145).

A table of "Appropriations" shows the "Exec Request", in millions, at "2,877.49" millions of dollars, representing a change of "81.94" millions of dollars with a percent change of "2.93". A table of "Disbursements" shows an "Exec Request", in millions, at "2,865.60" millions of dollars, representing a change of "112.23" millions of dollars, for a percent change of "4.08". (p. 145).

F. <u>Assembly Minority's "Green Book", under Assembly Ways and Means Committee Ranking Member Oaks' auspices (Exhibit 29-e):</u>

"\$2.1 billion for the Judiciary, \$48.3 million more than last year. This represents a 2.3% increase in spending."

"General State Charges: (Non-Salary) Benefits: \$730 million for General State charges. \$34 million more than last year. This pays for fringe benefits of employees of the court system, including all statutorily-required and collectively bargained benefits."

- 320. Plaintiffs now <u>additionally</u> challenge the constitutionality and lawfulness of the interchange provision appearing at §2 of the Judiciary's "single budget bill" (Exhibit 25-d) and replicated, *verbatim*, in §2 of defendant CUOMO's Legislative/Judiciary Budget Bill #S.6401/A.9001⁷ (Exhibit 27-b, p. 10). Such challenge is both *as written and as applied*.
- 321. Plaintiffs' challenge to the constitutionality of the interchange provisions, as written, begins with *Hidley v. Rockefeller*, 28 N.Y.2d 439, 447-449 (1971), wherein then Chief Judge Stanley Fuld, writing in dissent from the Court's decision addressed only to the issue of standing, stated:

The same interchange provision <u>identically</u> appears at §2 of the Judiciary's "single budget bill" for the past two fiscal years, incorporated *verbatim* in defendant CUOMO's Legislative/Judiciary budget bills for those years.

"...the provisions which permit the free interchange and transfer of funds are <u>unconstitutional on their face</u>...To sanction a complete freedom of interchange renders any itemization, no matter how detailed, completely meaningless and transforms a schedule of items or of programs into a lump sum appropriation in direct violation of Article VII of the Constitution. (underlining added).

322. As written, the interchange provision here at issue states:

"Notwithstanding any provision of law, the amount appropriated for any program within a major purpose within this schedule may be increased or decreased in any amount by interchange with any other program in any other major purpose, or any appropriation in section three of this act, with the approval of the chief administrator of the courts." (Exhibit 27-b, p. 10).

- 323. As written, the "notwithstanding any provision of law" language is vague and overbroad. The "law" includes the New York State Constitution and such is unconstitutional, on its face, as no statute can override the Constitution.
- 324. At bar, the "notwithstanding any provision of law" language authorizes the Judiciary to violate New York State Constitution, Article VII, §1, §4, §6, and §7, which speak of "itemized estimates", "items of appropriations"; "stated separately and distinctly...and refer each to a single object or purpose"; made for "a single object or purpose", that are "particular" and "limited"; that "distinctly specify the sum appropriated, and the object or purpose to which it is to be applied" as well as Article IV, §7 pertaining to the Governor's line-item veto of "items of appropriations".8
- 325. Moreover, the "law" includes the very statute governing judiciary interchanges, Judiciary Law §215 – and there is no basis for *sub silentio* repudiating its careful statutory

So, too, do the statutes pertaining to appropriations and reappropriations require specificity. See, also, State Finance Law §43, entitled "Specific appropriations limited as to use; certain appropriations to be specific": "Money appropriated for a specific purpose shall not be used for any other purpose, and the comptroller shall not draw a warrant for the payment of any sum appropriated, unless it clearly appears from the detailed statement presented to him by the person demanding the same as required by this chapter, that the purposes for which such money is demanded are those for which it was appropriated..."

restrictions and safeguards, other than to accomplish what both the statute and Constitution proscribe.

- 326. Judiciary Law §215(1), entitled "Special provisions applicable to appropriations made to the judiciary in the legislature and judiciary budget", states:
 - "1. The amount appropriated for any program within a major purpose within the schedule of appropriations made to the judiciary in any fiscal year in the legislature and judiciary budget for such year may be increased or decreased by interchange with any other program within that major purpose with the approval of the chief administrator of the courts who shall file such approval with the department of audit and control and copies thereof with the senate finance committee and the assembly ways and means committee except that the total amount appropriated for any major purpose may not be increased or decreased by more than the aggregate of five percent of the first five million dollars, four percent of the second five million dollars and three percent of amounts in excess of ten million dollars of an appropriation for the major purpose. The allocation of maintenance undistributed appropriations made for later distribution to major purposes contained within a schedule shall not be deemed to be part of such total increase or decrease.
- 327. Judiciary Law §215(1) restricts interchanges and their amounts to programs within the same "major purpose" as to which the Chief Administrator's approval must be filed with "the department of audit and control and copies thereof with the state finance committee and the assembly ways and means committee". Such accords with statutory requirements, conditions, and procedures set forth in State Finance Law §51 entitled "Interchange of appropriations or items therein" and the statutory sections to which State Finance Law §51 refers in stating:

"No appropriation shall be increased or decreased by transfer or otherwise except as provided for in this section or section fifty-three, sixty-six-f, seventy-two or ninety-three of this chapter, or article eight of the education law"9

328. In other words, as written, the interchange provision of §2 gives the Chief Administrator complete discretion to do whatever he wants, unbounded by any standard and by any

State Finance Law §53, entitled "Special emergency appropriations"; State Finance Law §66-f, entitled "Certain interagency transfers authorized"; State Finance Law §72, entitled "General fund"; State Finance Law

reporting/notice requirement to the other two government branches. Such is unconstitutional and unlawful.

- 329. As applied, the interchange provision is unconstitutional and unlawful in that it creates a slush-fund and permits concealment of true costs. It has enabled the Judiciary to surreptitiously fund, in fiscal year 2013-2014, the second phase of the judicial salary increase recommended by the Commission on Judicial Compensation's August 29, 2011 Report, without identifying the dollar amount of such increase, and, in fiscal year 2014-2015, to even more surreptitiously fund the third phase of the judicial salary increase recommended by the Commission's August 29, 2011 Report, without even identifying the third phase.
- 330. The Judiciary's responses to legitimate FOIL requests about its use of the interchange provision in fiscal year 2015-2016 and about the dollar costs of the Commission on Judicial Compensation's three-phase judicial salary increases, funded from reappropriations (Exhibits 50, 49) only further reinforce the unconstitutionality of the interchange provision, as applied.
- 331. Should defendant CUOMO adhere to his Commentary, "...I expect that [the Judiciary] will again absorb the first year of recommended judicial salary increases within an overall spending level of 2 percent in the 2016-17 budget" (Exhibit 27-a), the Judiciary will presumably fund the first phase of the judicial salary increase recommended by the December 24, 2015 Report of the Commission on Legislative, Judicial and Executive Compensation from the §3 reappropriations, via the §2 interchange provision.